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INTRODUCTION
In the last seven years, the Supreme Court has declared several
categories of prisoners, such as juvenile and mentally retarded offend-
ers,' to be categorically ineligible for capital punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. If these "death ineligible" offenders nonetheless
sit on death row with procedurally defective habeas corpus petitions,
can the writ be used to scrutinize their capital eligibility? In other
words, may a death-ineligible offender be executed on a technicality?
2
The issue is not hypothetical, and the role federal habeas corpus
is to play in redressing ineligibility violations remains a conspicuously
open question.3 That question, in turn, implicates some of the most
fundamental disagreements over the Supreme Court's equitable au-
thority over the habeas writ, as well as over the related "actual inno-
cence" laws that often determine the outcome of federal habeas
litigation. Existing ineligibility rules derive largely from actual inno-
cence law applicable to the more familiar concept of "crime inno-
cence"-the idea that, colloquially speaking, the petitioner "wasn't
I See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (mentally retarded offenders).
2 One important study found that over 27% of all capital cases are dismissed on
procedural grounds, without any merits consideration of claims presented therein. NANCY
J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II, & BRIANJ. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGA-
TION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY
STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM & EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 45
(2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf [hereinafter
HABEAS TECHNICAL REPORT]. To my knowledge, no study has collected comprehensive
data on death-ineligibility cases.
3 For example, the Fifth Circuit has plainly indicated that the statute of limitations in
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) applies to offenders found to be mentally retarded. See Rivera v. Quar-
terman, 505 F.3d 349, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2007). A number of federal circuit courts allow
claims brought in subsequent habeas petitions to be denied, without merits inquiry, on the
procedural ground that they should have been brought in a prior petition. See, e.g., In re
Hill, 437 F.3d 1080, 1083 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying on procedural grounds and without
merits inquiry authorization to file a successive habeas petition containing an ineligibility
claim); Resendiz v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 456, 458-59 (5th Cir. 2006) (denying as succes-
sive and without merits inquiry a claim that the prisoner was not competent to be exe-
cuted); Nance v. Norris, 429 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (Melloy, J., dissenting)
(dissenting against the court's denial of authorization to offender who had made a prima
facie showing of ineligibility); Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11 th Cir. 2004)
(refusing to authorize a potentially meritorious claim of incompetence).
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there, and didn't do it. ' ' 4 Unlike a crime-innocence claim, a death-
ineligibility challenge does not dispute that the offender committed
the murder for which he was convicted; it disputes only the constitu-
tionality of the capital sentence.
For many years, the question of whether procedural habeas bars
should have ineligibility exceptions has been fairly inconsequential.
By the time the Supreme Court recognized a narrow ineligibility ex-
ception to procedural default rules in 1992,5 habeas law conformed
primarily to a model favoring severe restrictions on relitigation of pro-
cedural questions, with exceptions for challenges supplementing via-
ble crime-innocence claims. The model's historical arc is familiar to
habeas scholars. Modern habeas restrictions are largely responses to
three developments during the Warren era: new procedural rights an-
nounced under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments; 6 their ap-
plication against states through the Fourteenth Amendment; 7 and the
vesting in state prisoners of a federal habeas remedy for violations of
those rights.8 Habeas activity swelled as offenders went to federal
court to relitigate procedural claims that they had lost in state pro-
ceedings. Moreover, many of the newly cognizable claims had no
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. These develop-
ments provoked landmark critiques by Professor Paul Bator and Judge
Henry Friendly,9 who argued that such litigation should be curtailed
dramatically. Our habeas regime is now geared largely toward restrict-
ing relitigation of procedural questions, with exceptions for chal-
lenges supplementing viable crime-innocence claims.
Death-ineligibility claims disrupt this established model of habeas
adjudication.10 They are not purely procedural challenges because, if
4 What I call "crime innocence" is usually called "actual innocence"; what I call
"death ineligibility" is usually called "actual innocence of the death penalty." In the inter-
est of clarity, I instead use the "crime innocence/death ineligibility" nomenclature.
5 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992).
6 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding, under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, that statements made during police interrogation are admissible only
if the defendant is informed of his right against self-incrimination and his right to an
attorney).
7 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).
8 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (holding that claims of constitutional
error are cognizable under the federal habeas statute).
9 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARv. L. REv. 441 (1963); HenryJ. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cmi. L. REv. 142 (1970). The content and influence of Bator's
and Friendly's arguments are discussed infra Part L.A and Part II.C.
10 I focus primarily on four types of ineligible prisoners in this Article. See infra text
accompanying notes 114-17. There are smaller categories of ineligible offenders that I do
not treat comprehensively. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008)
(holding that the death penalty may not be imposed for crimes against individuals that do
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successful, they would categorically bar a capital sentence. They are
also beyond the strictest readings of crime-innocence exceptions for
procedurally defective petitions because they do not constitute pure
challenges to a conviction's validity.
Recent scholarship has understandably emphasized the implica-
tions of DNA evidence for actual innocence law, 1 but that focus may
crowd out scrutiny of other developments that also affect central ten-
ets of habeas theory. The number of offenders in whom a death-ineli-
gibility claim vests has increased dramatically and will only grow as the
Court declares new categories of prisoners-probably those exhibit-
ing some sort of diminished capacity-exempt from capital punish-
ment. Existing scholarship has made little attempt to explore how
these claims' unique attributes change the habeas equation. In this
Article I argue that, in light of important distinctions between death-
ineligibility challenges and the claims on which existing law is pre-
mised, the Supreme Court should reformulate habeas relief available
to categories of offenders that may not be executed under the Eighth
Amendment.
In Part I, I map the traditional actual innocence concept in
habeas law, describing the two analytic variants in which it now ap-
pears-as a habeas "gateway" to bypass procedural obstacles and as a
"freestanding" claim. The development of actual innocence doctrine
is critical to understanding death ineligibility because it represents the
legal rules to which ineligibility challenges must currently conform.
In Part II, I argue that adjudicating ineligibility claims under the ex-
isting habeas framework-that of restrictions on procedural claims
with exceptions for crime innocence-does not make sense in light of
the policies that the restrictions and exceptions were designed to se-
cure. In Part III, I suggest how the Court may conform habeas doc-
trine to the unique questions that ineligibility claims present,
regardless of the procedural status of the habeas petition that contains
them. In short, I trace the genesis of and appropriate response to the
concept of death ineligibility, concluding that federal habeas relief
not result in death); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death
penalty may not be imposed for rape of an adult woman).
11 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1629 (2008) (ad-
vocating increased access to evidence of innocence, including DNA evidence, during trial
and postconviction appeals); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55
(2008) [hereinafter Garrett, Judging Innocence]; Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The
Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. Rav. 1305 (2004);
Erin Murphy, The Art in the Science of DNA: A Layperson's Guide to the Subjectivity Inherent in
Forensic DNA Typing, 58 EmoRy L.J. 489 (2008); J. Brent Alldredge, Note, Federal Habeas
Corpus and Postconviction Claims of Actual Innocence Based on DNA Evidence, 56 SMU L. REv.
1005 (2003); Matthew J. Mueller, Comment, Handling Claims of Actual Innocence: Rejecting
Federal Habeas Corpus as the Best Avenue for Addressing Claims of Innocence Based on DNA Evi-
dence, 56 CATH. U. L. Rv. 227 (2006).
[Vol. 95:329
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THE ROLE OF INNOCENCE IN HABEAS LAW
The writ of habeas corpus is not a substantive right; it is a proce-
dural remedy. Therefore, when the substantive scope of the Eighth
Amendment expands, the habeas remedy available to vindicate consti-
tutional violations remains limited by procedural obstacles imposed by
common law and by statute. This Part analyzes the role of crime inno-
cence in shaping modern habeas law. I ultimately argue that the sig-
nificant role of crime innocence explains why modern habeas law is
ill-equipped to properly adjudicate death-ineligibility claims, which
are entirely detached from guilt determinations. Part L.A discusses
how early "injustice" exceptions to procedural restrictions on habeas
relief developed into crime innocence "gateways" by which federal
courts could reach the merits of procedurally defective claims. The
historical context in which courts and Congress forged special crime-
innocence rules helps explain why those rules are not suited to the
orderly adjudication of ineligibility challenges. Part I.B discusses the
judicial rejection of freestanding crime-innocence claims, and ex-
plains that such a rejection does not affect the legal viability of death-
ineligibility claims.
A. Innocence Gateway Claims
The writ of habeas corpus is a civil, postconviction remedy with
roots dating back to fourteenth-century English common law.1 3 The
United States Constitution forbids Congress from suspending the writ
except during periods of invasion or rebellion.1 4 Congress statutorily
authorized federal courts to issue habeas relief to federal prisoners in
1789,15 and it made the writ generally available to state prisoners at
the inception of Reconstruction.1 6 In 1953, the Supreme Court held,
in Brown v. Allen, 17 that federal courts had statutory jurisdiction to ex-
amine the merits of constitutional questions adjudicated by state
12 1 deal only with prisoners sentenced to death by state courts.
13 See generally Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008) (tracing the history of
the writ of habeas corpus).
14 "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2.
15 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
16 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86.
17 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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courts of competent jurisdiction. 18 Many commentators consider
Brown v. Allen the inception of the modern habeas regime. 19 Modern
habeas doctrine is a creature of common, statutory, and constitutional
law.20 Congress made significant changes to the statute in 1948, 1966,
and 1996.21 The last of these enactments was the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),22 which altered or
enacted several key features of modern habeas law. 23 Capital prison-
ers may use federal habeas proceedings to attack either a conviction
or a sentence.
24
After Brown v. Allen definitively established that federal habeas ju-
risdiction included the authority to hear challenges to procedurally
sound state trials, 25 Professor Bator and Judge Friendly produced
landmark scholarship 26 that, although inconsistent in many ways,
shaped the conservative position on habeas for the next forty years.
Bator emphasized the epistemic limits of human inquiry and argued
that the criminal justice system ensures correctness by proxy of relia-
ble procedure. 27 Judge Friendly's central thesis was that innocence
should be the touchstone of any decision to disrupt state criminal pro-
cess. 28 Although Judge Friendly relied heavily on some of Bator's ar-
guments, 29 the two theories are in fact profoundly inconsistent: Judge
18 Id. at 458-59.
19 See Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, Reflections on Reform of § 2254 Habeas Peti-
tions, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1005, 1008 (1990); Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas
Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 362, 371-72 (1991);Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78
TEX. L. REv. 1703, 1716-17 (2000).
20 The leading habeas treatise describes the writ as a "civil, appellate, collateral, equi-
table, common law, and statutory procedure." I RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FED-
ERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter FHCPP].
21 See id. § 2.4(d) (viii), (ix), (xi) (respectively describing the 1948, 1966, and 1996
amendments).
22 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.).
23 This characterization obviously excludes habeas cases involving Guantonamo
detainees.
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (providing for attack on conviction); id. § 2255 (provid-
ing for attack on sentence).
25 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Even before Brown, however, when the Court would observe
that federal habeas jurisdiction was limited to questions of trial-court jurisdiction, the
Court suggested an unusually broad definition of that term. Jordan Steiker, Innocence and
Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303, 339 & n.172 (1993).
26 See sources cited supra note 9.
27 Bator, supra note 9, at 447-48. Three articles by Professor Larry W. Yackle together
constitute an exhaustive survey of post-Brown habeas legislative history and discuss exten-
sively the role that Bator's model played in that activity. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the
New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Bur. L. REv. 381, 422-43 (1996); Larry W. Yackle, The Exhaus-
tion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 393, 401-12 (1983); Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the
Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 541, 543-53 (2006).
28 Friendly, supra note 9, at 142.
29 Id. at 146 n.15.
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Friendly's presents innocence as the raison d'tre of habeas review
whereas Bator's considers innocence unknowable and, tersely speak-
ing, irrelevant.
30
Emboldened by theories that habeas relief should be reoriented
towards innocence (Judge Friendly) and circumscribed by the episte-
mic limits of human inquiry (Bator), the Court and Congress began to
impose procedural obstacles to issuance of the writ. Restrictions apply
to claims not properly presented to state courts ("defaulted claims"),
claims presented in prior federal petitions ("successive claims"),
claims that were not (but could have been) presented in prior federal
petitions ("abusive claims"), and claims that do not comply with the
federal statute of limitations ("untimely claims"). Concurrently, the
Court developed innocence "gateways"-showings that could over-
come the procedural restrictions in instances where the habeas peti-
tioner claimed actual innocence.3' Although the contents of the
innocence gateways applicable to defaulted, successive, abusive, and
untimely claims have largely converged, the various gateways origi-
nally derived from different authorities and exhibited different formu-
lations. Usually, the formulations contained some form of an
(in)justice standard, which considered more than just the guilt of the
offender. All of the gateway formulations, before they were narrowed
by the Rehnquist Court or by AEDPA, would have encompassed
death-ineligibility claims had such claims been cognizable at that
time. 3
2
1. Procedurally Defaulted Claims
A procedural default occurs where: (1) a petitioner violates a
state procedural rule, (2) the procedural violation is an adequate and
independent ground for denying the constitutional claim, and (3) the
procedural violation was clearly and unambiguously the reason state
relief was denied.33 A procedurally defaulted claim may nonetheless
be excused if the petitioner can either show cause for and prejudice
resulting from the default or show that failure to review the defaulted
claim would constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice.34
Around one-half of post-AEDPA capital habeas cases include a claim
that is ruled to be procedurally defaulted.3 5
30 Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Con-
tinuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 458 (1980).
31 See infra Parts I.A.1-3.
32 As I will explain in Part II, this winnowing process occurred not to eliminate the
then-unrecognized ineligibility claims, but to stem the tide of purely procedural
challenges.
33 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-32, 750 (1991).
34 See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995).
35 HIABEAs TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 48.
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Procedural default is unique among the doctrines subject to
crime-innocence gateways because it remains entirely a creature of
common law. It is a "prudential[,] rather than [a] jurisdictional," bar-
rier to relief.36 Fay v. Noia,3 7 decided by the Supreme Court in 1963
and representing a high water mark for habeas claimants, held that
defaulted claims would be excused unless the petitioner "deliberately
by-passed" that claim in state appellate or postconviction proceed-
ings.38 Unsettled by the habeas litigation that the deliberate bypass
standard invited, in Wainwright v. Sykes"9 the Court heightened the
showing necessary to excuse a default to the now-familiar "cause and
prejudice" standard.
40
The aggregate effect of the Court's post-Noia procedural default
jurisprudence was to virtually eliminate courts' ability to entertain de-
faulted claims for which offenders could not show cause and
prejudice. But because the post-Noia cases had ratcheted up the cause
and prejudice standard under the auspices of the Court's equitable
authority over the writ, the Court was also free to exercise that same
equitable authority to introduce ajudge-made mechanism for hearing
defaulted and unexcused claims.
Indeed, that is exactly what the Court did in Murray v. Carrier41
In order to prevent a "fundamental miscarriage of justice," the Court
held that, if a petitioner can show that "a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a
federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a show-
ing of cause for the procedural default."42 Not drawing directly from
any procedural default precedent, the Court cited Wainwright for the
proposition that its equitable authority freed it to craft whatever gate-
ways it deemed appropriate.
43
In Carrier, the Court for the first time connected the idea of "ac-
tual innocence" with the "miscarriage ofjustice" language from earlier
defaultjurisprudence. 44 In Sawyer v. Whitley, the Court eventually held
36 See Steiker, supra note 25, at 323-24 (explaining that defaults have a greater effect
on direct review because they implicate the Article III case-or-controversy requirement).
37 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
38 Id. at 438.
39 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
40 Id. at 90-91.
41 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
42 Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
reaffirmed the viability of the crime-innocence gateway for defaulted claims in House v. Bell,
547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006).
43 Car ier, 477 U.S. at 496 (quoting Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 81).
44 See also Schlup v, Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322 (1995) ("Explicitly tying the miscarriage
ofjustice exception to innocence thus accommodates both the systemic interests in finality,
comity, and conservation of judicial resources, and the overriding individual interest in
doing justice in the 'extraordinary case.'" (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496)).
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that "actual innocence" included death ineligibility.4 5 Carrier's hold-
ing echoed Justice Felix Frankfurter's dissent in Brown v. Allen,4 6 in
which he wrote that habeas relief must be available to "'prevent a
complete miscarriage of justice.' 47 In fact, scrutiny of the phrase
"miscarriage of justice"-as it is used in the originating procedural
default cases, in closely related evidentiary default cases, and in Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)-reveals that the concept of
innocence that Carrier incorporated is much broader than a crime-
innocence rule. The term's breadth is important because, in Part II, I
argue that there was never any historic restriction on ineligibility chal-
lenges and that they were not litigated until recently because they
were not, until that time, cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. 48
Originating Procedural Default Cases. The originating "miscarriage
of justice" opinions make clear that the originally formulated concept
was broader than pure crime innocence. In fact, a Brown v. Allen com-
panion case strongly suggests a broad reading of "miscarriage of jus-
tice."49 Justice Frankfurter wrote that refusing to hear two capital
prisoners' grand-jury discrimination claims, which were defaulted in
state court because the statement of appeal was hand delivered a day
late, would constitute a "complete . . . miscarriage of justice. '50 The
executions fit within the "miscarriage of justice" language even
though the prisoners' arguments could not be conceptualized as
crime-innocence claims.
Justice Frankfurter's "miscarriage of justice" formulation in Brown
v. Allen also relied heavily on Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United
States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy,51 a case involving a changed interpreta-
tion of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.52 The peti-
tioner, a Jehovah's Witness, was convicted for refusing induction into
the armed forces and had failed to appeal his induction procedures
because the controlling precedent clearly forbade it. When the law
changed and the petitioner sought habeas relief, Judge Hand held
that he should be permitted to challenge his conviction collaterally.
53
Punishing the forfeiture of a futile appeal, Judge Hand reasoned,
would constitute a "miscarriage of justice. '5 4 Although Judge Hand
45 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992).
46 344 U.S. 443, 554-60 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 558 (quoting United States ex rel. Kulick v. Kennedy, 157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d
Cir. 1946), rev'd sub nom. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947)).
48 Whether a majority of the current Court equates miscarriage of justice with actual
innocence is not clear. See 2 FHCPP, supra note 20, § 26.4.
49 Brown 344 U.S. at 556-60 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 558.
51 157 F.2d 811.
52 Pub. L. No. 76-783, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).




was grappling with a question of statutory retroactivity, when he re-
ferred to a "miscarriage of justice," he had obviously conceptualized
the term as broader than a crime-innocence rule.
Evidentiary Default Cases. Evidentiary defaults are analytically dis-
tinct from procedural defaults, but habeas jurisprudence provides
similar rules for situations in which a petitioner seeks to develop mate-
rialfacts (as opposed to claims) not presented to a state court. In Kee-
ney v. Tamayo-Reyes,55 the Supreme Court held that a failure to develop
a claim factually in state proceedings could be excused and that a fed-
eral evidentiary hearing could be mandated if a petitioner shows that
"a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result" from a failure to
conduct such a hearing. 56 The evidentiary default standard was ex-
pressly designed to mirror the converging (in)justice standards for de-
faulted and abusive claims.
57
AEDPA codified this rule, with some changes, forbidding federal
evidentiary hearings unless "the facts underlying the claim would be
sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense. ' 58 One of the seemingly
obvious purposes of the change in wording, which purges any refer-
ence to the "miscarriage ofjustice" standard, is to exclude death-ineli-
gibility claims from the exception to the evidentiary default bar. I do
not take up the exclusionary intent in depth here, as I analyze an anal-
ogous change in wording applicable to abusive claims. Suffice it to say
that the change in statutory wording reflects a belief that the prior
"miscarriage of justice" standard was indeed broad enough to encom-
pass ineligibility claims.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Supreme Court has
recently stated that, "[i]n our collateral-review jurisprudence, the
term 'miscarriage ofjustice' means that the defendant is actually inno-
cent," but that the term has broader meaning in other criminal con-
texts. 59 For example, the "miscarriage of justice" language also
encompasses more than "innocence" when the term is used in inter-
pretations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). The Court
has held that Rule 52(b), which grants an appeals court authority to
review a determination for "[a] plain error that affects substantial
rights ... even though it was not brought to the court's attention,"60 is
55 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
56 Id. at 12; cf. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991) (analogizing to injus-
tice standard for abusive claims); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (analogizing
to injustice standard for defaulted claims).
57 See Keeney, 504 U.S. at 7-8.
58 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B) (2006).
59 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1993).
60 FED. R. CriM. P. 52(b).
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to be used in "those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice
would otherwise result. '6 1 This interpretation is consistent with a re-
view of the Rule's drafting, in which the Committee expressed its pref-
erence that courts of appeals review prejudicial errors "so that any
miscarriage of justice may be thwarted.
'6 2
The Court has equated the "miscarriage of justice" language in
Rule 52(b) to "particularly egregious errors"6 3 and errors that "seri-
ously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings." 64 "Miscarriage of justice" does not have a particular
meaning as a habeas gateway simply because it has that meaning in a
rule of criminal procedure, but the general understanding of Rule
52(b) adds to the evidence that the injustice exception to procedur-
ally defective habeas claims was not, as originally conceived, limited to
questions of crime innocence.
2. Successive and Abusive Claims
The historical development of successive petition jurisprudence
also exemplifies the equitable authority the Supreme Court continues
to exercise over the writ, even where the inquiry is partially controlled
by statute. A successive petition may contain successive claims (those
raised and rejected in a prior petition), abusive claims (those available
but not raised in a prior petition), or both. For that reason, successive
and abusive claims are often analyzed and adjudicated together, and
they are controlled by the same provision in the federal habeas stat-
ute.65 Around five percent of post-AEDPA capital petitions are termi-
nated as successive.
6 6
Prior to AEDPA, the Court had established an "ends of justice"
gateway for abusive and successive claims. 67 In the 1920s, the Su-
preme Court held that lower federal courts could dismiss successive
federal petitions where the petitioner had raised the same claim in an
earlier petition and where relitigation would not serve "ends of jus-
61 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See also United States v.
Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that plain error review is used "to
prevent a miscarriage ofjustice"); Steiker, supra note 25, at 340-41 n.174 (collecting cases).
62 ADVIsoRY COmm. ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: PRELIMINARY DRAFr 263 (1943).
63 Young, 470 U.S. at 15 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163).
64 Id. (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2006) (successive claims); id. § 2244(b)(2) (abusive
claims).
66 See HABEAS TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
67 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991) (abusive claims); Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion) (successive claims).
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tice."68 The "ends of justice" standard applied to successive and abu-
sive claims and functioned in much same way as the "miscarriage of
justice" standard applied to defaulted claims. The "ends of justice"
language first appeared in a statute in the 1948 amendments to § 2244
and, even after that language was removed in the 1966 amendments,
the Court continued to imply that exception to claims by both federal
and state prisoners. 69 But, because the Court had invoked its surviv-
ing equitable authority to maintain "injustice" exceptions, it also exer-
cised that broad authority to craft common law limitations on their
scope by holding that successive and abusive claims were cognizable
"only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a
colorable showing of factual innocence.
'
"70
In 1991, McCleskey v. Zant reconfigured the abusive-claim gateway
so that it mirrored the gateway for procedural defaults and changed
the "ends of justice" standard to the "fundamental miscarriage ofjus-
tice" language indigenous to default doctrine. 71 The standards appli-
cable to same-claim successive petitions remained unchanged until
1996,72 when AEDPA revamped laws applicable to all successive peti-
tions. Under the current version of § 2244(b), successive claims are to
be dismissed, with no statutory exceptions; courts may entertain abu-
sive claims only in very limited circumstances.7 3 For a variety of rea-
sons, including the discovery of new DNA evidence and the
announcement of new and retroactively applicable rules of constitu-
tional law,7 4 many meritorious claims are controlled by AEDPA's suc-
cessive petition and abusive-claim rules.
75
AEDPA dramatically changed the gateway jurisprudence for abu-
sive claims. Prior to AEDPA, abusive-claim jurisprudence contained
gateways both for innocence claims and for claims where the peti-
tioner could show cause and prejudice.7 6 AEDPA merged the two for-
merly independent gateways and now requires a successive petition to
show cause and prejudice for the prior failure to raise the claim,
68 See Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1924); Wong Doo v. United States, 265
U.S. 239, 241 (1924).
69 See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 451-54.
70 Id. at 454 (discussing successive petitions).
71 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494.
72 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (pre-AEDPA case describing appli-
cation of "miscarriage of justice" exception to successive claims).
73 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1)-(2) (2006). I discuss how the Supreme Court reads
these bars forgivingly in Part III.C.2(c), infra.
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
75 For example, a claim may not mature until after an offender completes his first
round of federal habeas litigation. See Kyle P. Reynolds, Comment, "Second or Successive"
Habeas Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims After Panetti v. Quarterman, 74 U. CHI. L. REv.
1475, 1487-92 (2007) (discussing circuit courts' treatment of cases in which habeas peti-
tioner's successive petition includes newly ripened claim).
76 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-96.
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which must in turn demonstrate that, "but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the [claimant] guilty of the
underlying offense.
77
Several points merit emphasis. First, AEDPA eliminated any stat-
utory references to 'justice," codifying what the Supreme Court had
already effectively accomplished-equating "ends ofjustice" and "mis-
carriage of justice" with innocence. Second, AEDPA transformed the
innocence inquiry from a free-floating equitable exception into the
crux of the cause-and-prejudice inquiry. 78 Because the innocence
standard was always considered more demanding than the prejudice
requirement, AEDPA effectively made abusive claims harder to excuse
(because petitioners now had to show crime innocence). Third, no
excuse or innocence gateway allows habeas petitioners to circumvent
the bar on successive claims. Fourth, AEDPA increased the burden of
proof necessary to show innocence from "more likely than not" to
"clear and convincing. ' 79 Finally, and perhaps most central to my dis-
cussion, the phrasing of the innocence clause, at least superficially,
appears to exclude death-ineligibility claims. This situation creates
the conflicts between the Eighth Amendment and the statutory limits
of the habeas remedy that I explore in Part III.
3. Untimely Claims
AEDPA established, for the first time, a statute of limitations for
habeas petitions.8 0 A prisoner generally has a year from the date on
which his conviction becomes final or when a claim otherwise matures
to file for habeas relief.8 ' The statute of limitations tolls during the
pendency of state collateral attacks so that offenders may exhaust state
remedies without penalty. About four percent of post-AEDPA capital
cases include a time-barred claim, although equitable tolling (de-
scribed below) is frequently required to avoid the statutory limitations
rule.
82
77 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2) (B) (ii).
78 Compare McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 493-94 (describing abusive-claim prejudice prong
and actual innocence gateway separately), with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring
cause-and-prejudice showing for crime-innocence claim).
79 Compare Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) ("more likely than not" burden),
with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2) (B) (ii) ("clear and convincing" standard).
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (applicable to state prisoners).
81 I use the phrase "otherwise matures" because there are in fact four "trigger dates"
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Alternate trigger dates include the date on which an unconsti-
tutional state impediment to filing is removed (§ 2244(d) (1) (B)), the date on which the
Supreme Court declares a new constitutional right expressly made applicable to cases on
collateral review (§ 2244(d)(1)(C)), and the date on which the factual predicate for the
claim could be discovered with due diligence (§ 2244(d)(1)(D)).
82 See HABEAs TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 46.
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Under the statute of limitations, a new claim matures and is sub-
ject to a separate one-year limitations period when new predicate evi-
dence could be discovered with due diligence.8 3 Because a separate
statute of limitations applies to claims predicated on newly discovered
evidence and because there is no prejudice requirement, the statute
of limitations might superficially seem more forgiving than the rules
governing defaulted, successive, and abusive claims. The absence of
an innocence excuse, however, renders it perhaps the most severe of
all the procedural bars to habeas relief.
Most observers familiar with the statute's legislative genesis ac-
knowledge that AEDPA was shoddily crafted and poorly cohered,
8 4
but the omission of an actual innocence exception in § 2244(d) (1) is
particularly strange. After all, AEDPA did craft such an exception for
abusive claims in § 2244(b) (2) (B) and for federal new evidentiary
hearings in § 2254(e) (2) (B). The legislative history's two references
to the effect of the limitations statute on innocence claims are from
Representatives Watt and Pelosi, and those comments confirm the
provision's plain textual reading.
8 5
Because the limitations statute has no common law precursor and
because it contains no express crime-innocence or death-ineligibility
exception, it may be the catalyst for a potentially explosive conflict
between legislative restrictions on relief and the powerful interest in
avoiding unconstitutional executions.8 6 As I argue in Part III.C.2(c),
however, the universally recognized equitable-tolling exception could
be used to blunt any constitutional problems that the absence of a
crime-innocence or death-ineligibility gateway creates.
8 7
B. "Freestanding" Innocence
"Actual innocence" claims appear in two analytic variants. The
first is as a "gateway claim," which I discussed in Part L.A and which is
asserted to overcome a procedural defect. In other words, a successful
83 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1) (D).
84 See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. Rav.
443, 459-68 (2007) (presenting AEDPA's legislative history). Writing for the Court, Justice
Souter has remarked that "in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk
purse of the art of statutory drafting." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
85 See 142 CONG. REc. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt) ("By
imposing this limitation, important new evidence, even new compelling evidence of one's
innocence,... can no longer be offered, after that one bite within 1 year."); 142 CONG.
REG. H3614 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pelosi) ("The habeas corpus provi-
sions in this bill .... increase the risk that innocent persons could be held in prison in
violation of the constitution, or even executed.").
86 SeeJake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an "Actual Innocence" Exception to
AEDPA's Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 343, 387-91 (2001) (argu-
ing that AEDPA's statute of limitations violates the Constitution because it lacks an actual
innocence exception).
87 See sources cited infra note 370.
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gateway-innocence claim allows a court to entertain a defaulted, suc-
cessive, abusive, or untimely claim.
88
The second analytic variant is a "freestanding innocence claim," a
claim that a prisoner is innocent of capital murder, and that does not
supplement some other constitutional challenge.8 9 For example, im-
agine a prisoner who discovers new DNA evidence that definitively
disproves his role in a murder, but who either fails to allege or prove
an accompanying constitutional violation. Whether a "freestanding
innocence" claim is even cognizable on federal habeas review remains
an open question.90
Freestanding innocence jurisprudence actually subdivides into
two different concepts, and parsing the difference is important to un-
derstanding how death-ineligibility claims should fare under the rules.
The difference between the two freestanding innocence concepts is
roughly the difference between the question of whether a federal
court may grant relief on a meritorious freestanding innocence claim
and whether a federal court must do so.
The habeas statute allows prisoners to obtain habeas relief only
for constitutional violations,91 and the Court has wrestled mightily with
the question of which constitutional provision a freestanding crime-
innocence claim actually invokes.92 If a freestanding innocence claim
does in fact state a constitutional violation (more on that below), then
it is cognizable under the habeas statute and a federal court may grant
habeas relief. The habeas statute, however, unambiguously imposes
all sorts of remedial limits on meritorious claims, and few argue that
Congress cannot promulgate any restrictions on habeas relief. The
question of whether a federal court must grant relief naturally arises
whenever a routine restriction on the remedy (such as the statute of
limitations) is applied to a potentially meritorious innocence claim.
Under such circumstances, the only way to grant relief on a freestand-
ing innocence claim would be to declare the routine restriction un-
88 Recall that there is in fact no statutory innocence gateway for untimely claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
89 More precisely speaking, a claim is "freestanding" whenever a prisoner does not
prove an accompanying constitutional violation. These situations include where the of-
fender makes no accompanying constitutional claim, where the petitioner made the claim
but its merits cannot be decided because it was subject to a successful procedural defense,
or where the petitioner simply lost on the merits of the constitutional claim.
90 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419-27 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Herrera majority opinion contained dicta suggesting that a freestanding innocence
claim might not be cognizable. See id. at 401 (majority opinion) ("Few rulings would be
more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal habeas review of free-
standing claims of actual innocence."). The Court passed on the freestanding innocence
question again in House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006) and in Dist. Att'y's Office for the
ThirdJud. Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009).
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
92 See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
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constitutional or to read some implied innocence exception into the
statute.
9 3
Understanding the Court's skepticism of freestanding crime in-
nocence is crucial to understanding why death-ineligibility claims do
not create similar cognizability problems under the habeas statute. In-
eligibility claims are uncontroversially anchored in the Eighth Amend-
ment and do not ask courts to consider the thorny issue of whether
habeas review may be used to redress arguably nonconstitutional
claims. I explain this important distinction further in Part III.B, but
for now I focus on Herrera v. Collins,94 the 1993 case in which the
Court first took up the freestanding crime-innocence issue.
Herrera was sentenced to death in Texas and claimed, in a suc-
cessive federal petition, that he was actually innocent of the murder.
95
Herrera argued that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid a
state from executing an actually innocent offender and that he was
entitled to habeas relief to prevent such an execution.
96
In a fractured decision and narrow opinion, the Supreme Court
denied his petition. Rather than reaching the broad question of
whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execu-
tion of an actually innocent prisoner, the Court held only that Her-
rera's claim did not fit within its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
and, because state corrective process was available, that Texas proce-
dure did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural due
process guarantees. 97 In fact, the Justices seemed unable to agree on
precisely what they were deciding.98
But the various opinions make clear what the Justices did not de-
cide. The Court did state in dicta that "[c]laims of actual innocence
based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a
93 Part III.C.2 considers the feasibility of each of these options in the ineligibility
context.
94 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
95 Id. at 396.
96 Id. at 398.
97 See id. at 405-07, 411.
98 Compare id. at 407 n.6 ("The question before us . . . [is whether procedural due
process] entitles petitioner to judicial review of his 'actual innocence' claim."), with id. at
420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T] he issue before us is .... whether a fairly convicted
and therefore legally guilty person is constitutionally entitled to yet another judicial pro-
ceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt anew, 10 years after conviction, notwithstanding
his failure to demonstrate that constitutional error infected his trial."), and id. at 427
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("We granted certiorari on the question whether it violates due
process or constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for a State to execute a [fairly con-
victed prisoner who] later alleges that newly discovered evidence shows him to be "actually
innocent."), and id. at 430-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("We really are being asked to
decide whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly
convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discov-
ered evidence.").
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ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding." 99
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
however, wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing that the Court
had not resolved the freestanding innocence question. 10 0 Justices
Harry Blackmun, David Souter, John Paul Stevens, and Byron White
each wrote or joined in separate opinions that would have recognized
the cognizability of freestanding innocence claims.10 1 Justice Black-
mun's dissent concluded with the famously scathing remark that
"[t] he execution of a person who can show that he is innocent comes
perilously close to simple murder."
10 2
Thirteen years later, when the cognizability of a freestanding in-
nocence claim was again before the Court in House v. Bell, the Court
still refused to decide the issue. 10 3 It again demurred in this most
recent term, deciding District Attorney's Office v. Osborne on other
grounds. 10 4 Over the summer, however, the Court took the extraordi-
nary step of invoking its original authority to grant habeas writs (as
opposed to its authority to review habeas decisions in lower courts) to
transfer a freestanding claim for adjudication in federal district
court. 0 5 The transfer order provoked an angry dissent by Justice
Antonin Scalia, who considered the instructions to the district court a
"fool's errand" and cited Herrera in support of the proposition that the
constitutional status of such actual innocence claims remained in seri-
ous dispute.
10 6
The Herrera dicta disputing the cognizability of freestanding inno-
cence claims is central to my death-ineligibility discussion because of
the interests it invokes in support of that position: namely, the notions
that (1) habeas exists to redress constitutional errors and not to con-
duct factfinding; 10 7 (2) the relief available to a petitioner with a suc-
cessful freestanding innocence claim is unclear; 10 8 (3) evidence goes
99 Id. at 400.
100 Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101 See id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (proposing a standard that would require a
petitioner to show that "no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasona-
ble doubt" (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 442
(Blackmun,J., dissenting) (proposing a standard that would require a petitioner to "show
that he probably is innocent").
102 Id. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
104 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322 (2009).
105 See In re Davis, No. 08-1443, 2009 ATL 2486475, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2009). Under-
standing precisely what Davis will ultimately mean is at this point difficult because no fed-
eral court has actually had to rule on the merits and decide the constitutionality of the
freestanding claim at issue in Davis.
106 See id. at *2 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
107 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
108 See id. at 402-03.
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stale over time; 10 9 and (4) the gateways applicable to procedural de-
fenses secure the innocence interests expressed in the habeas stat-
ute.110 These interests resurface in support of several types of habeas
restrictions-not just as arguments against the cognizability of free-
standing innocence claims. This Part explained the various doctrines
to which these interests attach, and Part II will explain why those inter-
ests are not promoted by adjudicating newer death-ineligibility catego-
ries under the existing habeas framework.
II
THE LIMITS OF AcTUAL INNOCENCE IN ADJUDICATING
DEATH-INELIGIBILITY CLAIMS
Three Warren-era developments conspired to increase dramati-
cally the volume of habeas litigation created by state prisoners: the
expansion of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment procedural rights,
the incorporation of those rights against the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the widespread use of the federal habeas
remedy to redress these violations."' Modern procedural restrictions
and the limits on freestanding innocence claims were direct responses
to these developments. In this Part I argue that newly cognizable
death-ineligibility challenges differ materially from the litigation that
provoked these restrictions, and should not by default be subject to
doctrine crafted for the earlier phenomena.
I begin this Part by charting early death-ineligibility litigation, cul-
minating in Sawyer.' 2 Sawyer announced what I call the "paradigm
ineligibility claim," a claim that an offense satisfies no statutory aggra-
vating conditions necessary to impose a capital sentence." 3 I then
describe four major non-paradigm death-ineligibility categories: non-
triggermen convicted of felony murder without sufficient culpabil-
ity;114 juvenile offenders; l" 5 mentally retarded offenders; 1 6 and of-
fenders who are not competent to be executed. 17 I conclude with
the argument that, because non-paradigm ineligibility claims do not
compromise the interests that provoked habeas restrictions, the law
should treat them differently.
118
109 See id. at 403-04.
11o See id. at 404.
111 See sources cited supra notes 6-8.
112 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
113 See id. at 343-44.
114 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
115 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
116 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
117 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986).
118 At the beginning of the October 2009 Term, the Supreme Court heard two noncapi-
tal ineligibility cases, both of which involved the issue of whether the Eighth and Four-
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A helpful conceptual framework divides a capital trial into three
phases: the phase where the court considers the defendant's guilt; the
phase where the court considers the defendant's capital eligibility;
and the phase where the court considers mitigating evidence that may
warrant a noncapital sentence. The trial court may not actually con-
duct these inquiries discretely (for example, eligibility and mitigation
are often considered simultaneously), but the framework usefully iso-
lates the eligibility concept I explore here.
A. Paradigm Death-Ineligibility Claims
Modern death-penalty jurisprudence begins in 1972 with Furman
v. Georgia, t9 which, in holding that Georgia's capital sentencing stat-
ute allowed the death penalty to be arbitrarily imposed, effectively
struck down almost all existing state capital sentencing schemes. 120 In
the four years after Furman, at least thirty-five states passed capital sen-
tencing statutes, many of them bifurcating capital trials into guilt and
punishment phases. 121 Gregg v. Georgia upheld the use of bifurcated
capital proceedings, holding that such systems are "more likely to en-
sure elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in
Furman."'22 After Gregg, every state that retains capital punishment
has instituted a bifurcated system. 123 The state schemes that the
Court has upheld involve sentencing statutes that (1) cabin jury dis-
cretion and (2) allow individualized culpability determinations.
24
Under these statutes, states will not impose death without proof
of certain statutorily defined aggravating circumstances. The first
death-ineligibility litigation grew out of these sentencing require-
ments. The presence of sufficient jury-found aggravators rendered
the offender death eligible, and, in Sawvyer, 125 the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a death-ineligibility challenge qualified under the
teenth Amendments permit juveniles to be sentenced to life without parole. See Sullivan v.
Florida, 987 So.2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2157 (U.S. May 4,
2009) (No. 08-7621); Graham v. Florida, 982 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert.
granted, 129 S.Ct. 2157 (U.S. May 4, 2009) (No. 08-7412). These cases, not decided at the
time of publication, are significant because they represent the Court's most important
foray into noncapital ineligibility questions, but they are beyond the scope of this article for
that reason.
119 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (plurality opinion) (per curiam).
120 See Randy Hertz & Robert Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v.
Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L.
REv. 317, 319 (1981).
121 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301 (1987).
122 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191-92 (1976).
123 See Caren Myers, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for Use Immu-
nity, 97 COLUM. L. Rev. 787, 796 (1997).
124 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153;Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
125 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
pre-AEDPA gateways for defaulted, successive, and abusive claims. 126
A Louisiana court sentenced Sawyer to death under a capital sentenc-
ing statute requiring that a jury find at least one statutory aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 127 The jury found three such fac-
tors, one of which the Louisiana Supreme Court struck down as un-
supported by the evidence, and no mitigating circumstances. 128 On a
successive petition, Sawyer argued that the prosecution unconstitu-
tionally kept from the jury evidence disproving two aggravators. 129 In
the absence of any aggravating circumstances, Sawyer argued, the
Eighth Amendment barred his execution.
130
The Court considered three options for the death-ineligibility
gateway standard. First, it rejected the strictest standard, which would
have confined the gateway to evidence tending to disprove an element
of the capital offense.13 1 Second, it rejected the most lenient gateway
standard, which would have permitted claims challenging any deter-
mination implicit in the death sentence, including evaluation of miti-
gating evidence. 13 2 The Court instead opted for an intermediate
standard, which focused on whether the evidence bore on what it de-
scribed as an offender's eligibility to be executed. 13 3 Using that stan-
dard, the Court held that Sawyer did not "show by clear and
convincing evidence that but for constitutional error at his sentencing
hearing, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the
death penalty."
' 134
Rather than casting "actual innocence of the death penalty" nar-
rowly as an elemental question of capital murder, or broadly as a ques-
tion of mitigating evidence, the Court chose to focus on the concept
of death ineligibility-whether the evidence offered to satisfy the in-
nocence gateway would tend to disprove the existence of statutory ag-
gravating factors that made a petitioner eligible for the death penalty.
Because the affidavits and psychiatric reports Sawyer submitted did
not show, by clear and convincing evidence, that none of the two ag-
gravating factors that the sentencing jury identified were satisfied, the
Court reasoned that Sawyer had not made the requisite gateway show-
ing.135 I refer to instances in which an offender argues that he would
not satisfy any statutory aggravators as "paradigm" ineligibility claims
126 Id. at 335.
127 Id. at 342 & n.9 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (1984)).
128 Id. at 337 & n.2.
129 Id. at 347-50.
130 Id. at 341.
131 Id. at 343.
132 Id. at 343-45.
133 Id. at 347.
134 Id. at 350.
135 Id. at 349-50.
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for two reasons: because Sawyer claims were, until recently, by far the
most common type of ineligibility claim and because, to the extent
that they invite relitigation of fact questions resolved by a jury and
subject to evidentiary decay, they fit neatly within the familiar critiques
of the Warren Court's habeas jurisprudence.
One problem with the pro forma extension of existing innocence
rules to death-ineligibility claims is that they were configured more or
less at a time when many death-ineligibility claims were not cognizable
under the Eighth Amendment. And the paradigm claims that were
cognizable fit neatly within the prevailing models of habeas litigation.
B. Non-Paradigm Death-Ineligibility Claims
Because a paradigm ineligibility inquiry is in many respects simi-
lar to that conducted for more familiar procedural and crime-inno-
cence claims, the controlling ineligibility law became a feature of
actual innocence jurisprudence somewhat uneventfully. Paradigm in-
eligibility claims were almost certainly what Congress had in mind
when it enacted AEDPA, crafting statutory gateways for offenders who
argue that they are not "guilty of the underlying offense."
136
Non-paradigm claims, more recently cognizable under the
Eighth Amendment, are distinguishable from their paradigm counter-
parts in important ways: the vast majority of non-paradigm claims in-
volve fact questions that are not subject to evidentiary decay; many
involve challenges that were neither litigated at trial nor decided by a
jury; and there are reasons to be skeptical of state criminal process
even for challenges that are adjudicated in state court. I briefly de-
scribe the existing non-paradigm claims below, but a new ineligibility
model is also central to the orderly adjudication of Eighth Amend-
ment exemptions that the Supreme Court recognizes in the future.
1. Culpability for Felony Murder (Enmund and Tison)
In Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona,137 the Court considered
the level of culpability an offender must exhibit in order to be eligible
for execution as a non-triggerman in a felony murder. In Enmund, the
Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment forbids capital
punishment for such offenders who lack a sufficiently culpable mental
state. 138 In Tison, the Court held that Arizona's "reckless indifference
to human life" requirement satisfied the Enmund culpability
requirement. 139
136 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), 2254(e) (2) (B) (2006).
137 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
138 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797.
139 Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
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Claims under Tison are unlikely to precipitate a collision between
habeas restrictions and death ineligibility-a situation where an ineli-
gible claimant will be denied habeas relief on a technicality. Tison
claims are less frequent than Sawyer claims, but, of the four non-para-
digm ineligibility challenges I discuss here, they are the most similar
to the sorts of claims that prompted procedural restrictions in habeas
law. Because the issue of mental culpability is a fact question that will
be decided by a trial jury and is subject to evidentiary decay, existing
habeas law is already reasonably well configured to accommodate Ti-
son claims.
2. Juvenile Offenders (Roper)
Decided in 2005, Roper v. Simmons held that executing prisoners
who were under the age of 18 at the time of the offense constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. 140 Like Tison claims, Roper claims
probably will not require federal habeas litigation at all. Prosecutors
will not seek the death penalty for juvenile offenders, and qualifying
offenders already on death row will almost certainly have their
sentences commuted or will prevail in state postconviction proceed-
ings.141 State process was similarly sufficient to accommodate the Su-
preme Court's 1977 ruling in Coker v. Georgia,142 which barred capital
punishment for the rape of adult women.1
43
3. Mentally Retarded Offenders (Atkins)
Perhaps the most active area of ineligibility litigation involves a
claim that, under Atkins v. Virginia,144 the Eighth Amendment prohib-
140 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). The Supreme Court is currently considering whether the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments also prohibit juveniles from being sentenced to life
without parole. See supra note 118.
141 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from Substance
and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 721,
723 (2008) (noting that the ban on executingjuvenile offenders has rendered "virtually no
litigation [because] offenders who committed the crime before turning eighteen have had
their sentences commuted via judicial or clemency proceedings").
142 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
143 Id. at 592. There were five affected offenders on death row when the Court de-
cided Coker. Id. at 596-97. Coker's case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
See Coker v. State, 238 S.E.2d 690, 690 (Ga. 1977). Two other prisoners received relief in
another case the Court decided that same day, Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977).
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the death
sentences and remanded the two cases for resentencing. See Eberheart v. State, 238 S.E.2d
1, 1 (Ga. 1977); Hooks v. State, 238 S.E.2d 1, 1 (Ga. 1977). The Georgia Supreme Court
vacated the sentence of another offender whose case was before it on mandatory appeal
during the pendency of Coker. See Hughes v. State, 236 S.E.2d 829, 834 (Ga. 1977). Finally,
the Georgia Supreme Court remanded for resentencing the case of a death row inmate
sentenced to death for rape before Coker was decided, although I cannot precisely deter-
mine the procedural posture of that case. See Boyer v. State, 240 S.E.2d 68, 68 (Ga. 1977).
144 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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its a petitioner's execution because he is mentally retarded. 145 Atkins,
decided in 2002, left the precise definition of and procedures for ad-
judicating mental retardation to the states.' 46 Atkins litigation poign-
antly illustrates how meritorious death-ineligibility claims are not
redressed by state procedure and end up in federal court.147
In defining mental retardation, Atkins relied primarily on clinical
formulations used by the American Association of Mental Retardation
("AAMR") and by the American Psychiatric Association ("APA"). 148
Those definitions varied slightly, but both formulations-consistent
with any clinical definition of mental retardation-defined the condi-
tion as having three components: (1) intellectual impairment; (2)
adaptive deficits; and (3) evidence of onset before the age of 18.149
Although estimates state that between one and three percent of the
general population is mentally retarded, estimates for death row of-
fenders vary between four and twenty percent.1 50
Atkins was not popular in the states that had allowed capital pun-
ishment of mentally retarded offenders, and, because of the procedu-
ral leeway the decision afforded those states, some do not use a
clinical standard of retardation. 51 That circumstance, combined with
byzantine state postconviction procedure that prisoners must often
navigate without counsel, means that meritorious but procedurally de-
fective Atkins claims frequently find their way into federal court.
1 52
Federal courts are likely to hear meritorious Atkins claims because
certain states use underinclusive definitions of retardation. 153 Al-
though state legislation defining retardation is mostly consistent with
145 Id. at 321.
146 Id. at 317.
147 See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 141, at 731-39 (arguing that the procedu-
ral leeway given to states so that they could implement Atkins resulted in a state postconvic-
inon regime that undercuts the substantive right of mentally retarded offenders not to be
executed).
148 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
149 Id. at 308 n.3 (citing AM. Ass'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DEFINITION, CLSSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992); AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000)).
150 See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders and
Excluding Them from Execution, 30J. LEGIs 77, 86 (2003). As of May 2008, eighty-four death
sentences have been commuted under Atkins. See JOHN BLUME, DEATH PENALTY INFORMA-
TION CENTER, SENTENCE REVERSALS IN MENTAL RETARDATION CASES (2008), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/sentence-reversals-mental-retardation-cases.
151 See, e.g., ExparteBriseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (using an aclin-
ical mental-retardation test to determine eligibility for the death penalty).
152 1 address the problems with state postconviction treatment of ineligibility claims
more generally in Section III.A.2, infra.
153 SeeJohn H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and its Application in
Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L.R. 625, 629 (2009) (describing, for example, North Carolina's
restrictive definition of metal retardation, which uses a "strict IQ cutoff and assesses adap-
tive functioning deficits by focusing on what the claimant can do rather than focus-
ing ... on the individual's limitations").
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the clinical definitions in Atkins, state judicial formulations are not.
This problem, which usually involves a selective focus by the courts on
the adaptive strengths of Atkins claimants, disproportionately affects
litigants in states with active capital dockets, such as Alabama, 15 4 Flor-
ida, 155 and Mississippi.' 5 6 I draw the following examples largely from
Texas, which executes more prisoners than any other state.' 5 7 The
Texas legislature has twice forgone the opportunity to statutorily de-
fine the term "retardation,"'1 5 8 thus leaving that responsibility to state
courts. The state's highest criminal court has identified seven "evi-
dentiary factors.., indicative of mental retardation or of a personality
disorder" to guide lower state courts in deciding Atkins claims.
159
These factors are as follows: whether those who knew the offender
during childhood thought he was retarded; whether the offender for-
mulated plans and carried them through or acted impulsively;
whether the offender's conduct shows leadership or shows that he is
led around by others; whether his conduct in response to external
stimuli is rational and appropriate; whether the offender responds co-
herently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions; whether
the offender can hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others' inter-
ests; and whether the crime required forethought, planning, and com-
plex execution of purpose.160 That approach, which often substitutes
for clinical inquiry, has been a disaster. First, the Texas factors have
morphed from a means of distinguishing retardation from personality
154 In Ex partePerkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002), Alabama denied relief under a non-
statutory definition of retardation, emphasizing that the petitioner did not have adaptive
deficits because he was married and employed. Id. at 456. In Smith v. State, No. CR-92-
1258, 2009 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 2, at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. Jan. 16, 2009), the court em-
phasized that the petitioner did not have adaptive deficits because he could function well
in society, maintain a bank account, and perform other activities. Id. at *10. In Clemons v.
State, No. CR-01-1355, 2005 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 128, at *1 (Ala. Crim. App. June 24.
2005), the court denied the existence of adaptive limitations on the basis of only the peti-
tioner's "employment history, the ability to have interpersonal relationships, being exten-
sively involved in criminal activity, post-crime craftiness on the part of the criminal, and
being able to use community resources." Id. at *15.
155 In Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2007), the Supreme Court of Florida upheld
a state trial-court ruling because the state court found that the defendant demonstrated
the ability to engage in a romantic relationship, drive a car, and obtain employment Id. at
149-50. The appellate court heavily deferred to the trial court's resolution of the conflict-
ing evidence and its ultimate conclusion against the defendant. Id. at 150.
156 In Wiley v. State, 890 So. 2d 892 (Miss. 2004), the Supreme Court of Mississippi
upheld the lower court's determination that the petitioner did not have adaptive deficits
because the prisoner operated heavy machinery, was employed, was admitted to radio op-
erator school, legally drove a car, and provided for his family. See id. at 896-97.
157 Death Penalty Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty, at 3, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
158 See Moore v. Dretke, No. Civ.A.603-CV-224, 2005 WL 1606437, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Tex.
July 1, 2005), vacated sub nom. Moore v. Quarterman, No. 05-70038, 2006 WL 1776605 (5th
Cir. June 29, 2006).
159 Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
160 Id. at 8-9.
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disorder into an independent definition of mental retardation. Sec-
ond, the factors have no scientific or clinical content. Third, the ap-
proach provides no rules for how courts are to weigh the factors in
making a retardation determination. Fourth, the factors emphasize
the cognitive attributes that committing the crime required, but a
clinical retardation inquiry involves no such emphasis. 16' In Texas,
the likelihood that a mentally retarded offender will seek relief in fed-
eral court because he has been wrongly adjudicated death eligible
under the aberrant state definition is extremely high. Texas state
courts have rejected almost every contested Atkins claim on collateral
review. 162
Federal courts will also encounter meritorious but defective At-
kins claims because so much of the procedural status of a federal peti-
tion turns on the ability of impaired offenders to negotiate
extraordinarily complex state postconviction process without coun-
sel.1 63 Prisoners lack a federal right to counsel during state postcon-
viction proceedings. 164 A thorough Atkins argument usually requires a
pro-bono attorney, who may be unfamiliar with the state record, to
review trial court records for evidence of retardation; assess the of-
fender's social history and functional ability through first-person inter-
views; convince the offender to formally release school and medical
records; compose record requests to the relevant schools, hospitals,
and prisons; send follow-up requests; review the interviews as well as
school and medical records for evidence of mental retardation; locate,
interview, and obtain affidavits from people who knew the offender as
a minor; procure a mental health expert to perform free testing for
impaired intellectual and adaptive functioning; and have the expert
prepare a comprehensive report.165 Only then may counsel even be-
gin drafting a state Atkins petition. The attorney must conduct this
time-consuming process while the federal statute of limitations is run-
161 In one Texas case, a petitioner was denied state collateral relief in part because, the
court reasoned, the petitioner "functioned sufficiently in his younger years to hold jobs,
get a driver's license, marry and have a child." Wilson v. Quarterman, No. 6:06-cv-140,
2009 WL 900807, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009).
162 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 141, at 728 & n.44 (citation omitted).
163 It is useful to understand the difference between mental retardation claims adjudi-
cated in state trial proceedings and those adjudicated on state postconviction review. A
state prisoner must exhaust state remedies before filing a § 2254 petition. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(c) (2006). I explore the vagaries of state trial adjudication in Part III.A.1, infra, but
the problems I discuss in this paragraph happen to pertain primarily to Atkins claims de-
cided on state postconviction review.
164 See Celestine Richards McConville, The Meaninglessness of Delayed Appointments and
Discretionary Grants of Capital Postconviction Counsel 42 TuLsA L. REv. 253, 256 & n.31 (2006)
(citing Supreme Court cases denying such right).
165 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face is Always Well-Hidden". The Role of
Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 201, 203 (1996)
(enumerating the responsibilities of lawyers in death penalty cases).
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ning because, until a state habeas petition is filed, no state postconvic-
tion proceedings are "pending" within the meaning of
§ 2244(d) (2) 166 Prisoners were therefore stuck in a dilemma-either
spend precious portions of the limitations period developing every as-
pect of an Atkins claim before filing a pleading in state court or file
less robust pleadings and risk having a more substantial federal peti-
tion dismissed as unexhausted and procedurally barred.167 Even
timely federal Atkins claims are often procedurally defaulted because
an offender, sometimes acting pro se, is unable to comply with com-
plex state postconviction procedure. Indeed, the aggressive imposi-
tion of state procedural rules is beginning to seriously undermine the
substantive prohibition in Atkins.1
68
To illustrate how obscure state procedural rules can trigger fed-
eral procedural bars, I take yet another example from Texas. Texas
courts had created a "two-forum" bar that prevented Atkins petitioners
from seeking state collateral relief during the pendency of any other
federal postconviction litigation. 169 When Atkins was decided, how-
ever, many qualifying offenders had other federal postconviction liti-
gation pending. Those prisoners could not amend their federal
petitions to include the Atkins claim because doing so would get all of
their claims thrown out of federal court as unexhausted. 170 Even if
their Atkins claims were ready for filing in state court, those prisoners
could not actually file them during the pendency of the earlier habeas
proceeding because the Atkins claim would be dismissed under state
abusive-writ rules. These prisoners simply had to sit on viable Atkins
claims, watching the limitations period run, because they were subject
to the unintended effects of the two-forum rule.171 As a result, the
state has time-barred a number of these claims in federal court.17
2
Because Atkins claimants first sought state collateral relief, only now
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2).
167 Federal courts will sometimes impose a procedural default bar on unexhausted
claims where it is apparent that there will be a procedural defect with the subsequent state
filing that cannot be cured. See Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 605 (5th Cir. 2009).
168 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 141, at 724-31.
169 See In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 2006).
170 See id. at 875-76.
171 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals abolished the dual-forum rule for precisely
this reason in 2004, seeExparteSoffar, 143 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), but that did
not help offenders who sat on their Atkins claims before that time. The Fifth Circuit has
invoked equitable tolling to alleviate the two-forum problem, but it has only done so for
those petitioners who lost their entire limitations period. Compare Wilson, 442 F.3d at
874-78 (equitably tolling the limitations period because petitioner's initial federal habeas
petition was still pending when the AEDPA limitations period expired), with In re Lewis,
484 F.3d 793, 797-98 (5th Cir. 2007) (refusing to equitably toll the limitations period be-
cause petitioner's initial federal habeas petition had been resolved three months before
the AEDPA limitations period expired).
172 See, e.g., Lewis, 484 F.3d at 797-98;
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are claims in this posture percolating in federal court. Decisions pro-
cedurally defaulting and time-barring meritorious Atkins claims impli-
cate the major issues I discuss in this Article.
173
4. Incompetent Offenders (Ford and Panetti)
In Ford v. Wainwright,174 the Supreme Court announced that the
Eighth Amendment forbids states from putting to death offenders
who would not be competent to be executed at the time the sentence
would actually be imposed. 175 Although the Court's holding was sub-
stantively narrow, Justice Lewis F. Powell penned a widely followed
concurrence arguing that the Constitution barred capital punishment
of prisoners who were either not aware of their punishment or the
reason for it.1
7 6
Ford also contained an important Fourteenth Amendment proce-
dural due process ruling. Florida actually had a statutory restriction
on the execution of incompetent offenders. 177 That restriction, how-
ever, vested authority for the competency determination in the gover-
nor, creating a severe conflict of interest because the governor is also
Florida's chief law enforcement officer.178 Moreover, the Florida pro-
cess was nonadversarial, and the prisoner lacked an opportunity ei-
ther to introduce evidence of his insanity or to rebut evidence that the
state introduced. The Supreme Court held that such process was un-
constitutional, and required a system of adversarial adjudication to en-
force the restriction against executing incompetent offenders. 179
Panetti v. Quarterman,180 decided in 2007, also contained impor-
tant substantive and procedural rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed
the substantive standard for incompetency claims offered in Justice
Powell's Ford concurrence.18 1 In order for an offender to qualify as
competent to be executed, Panetti held, the offender must understand
that he is going to be put to death and why.' 8 2 Panetti knew that he
was being sentenced to death and was aware that Texas's stated reason
for doing so was his murder conviction, but he believed the reason
was pretextual and that he was actually being capitally punished for
173 See infra Part III.
174 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
175 See id. at 409-10.
176 Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007) (noting thatJustice Powell's concurrence
is controlling).
177 See Ford, 477 U.S. at 403.
178 See id. at 416.
179 Id. at 417-18.
180 551 U.S. 930 (2007).




preaching the gospel in spiritual warfare between good and evil.183
The Supreme Court held that Panetti's awareness of Texas's stated
sentencing rationale did not alone render him competent for execu-
tion and that he had to actually possess a rational understanding of
why that punishment was being imposed.1
84
Panetti also announced an important procedural ruling, affirming
that, if an offender makes a threshold showing of incompetence, the
offender must be afforded Ford protections.1 85 Specifically, several cir-
cumstances rendered Panetti's competency adjudication constitution-
ally infirm, including the state court's refusal to transcribe the
proceedings, to inform Panetti's lawyer of significant events occurring
over the course of the adjudication, to afford Panetti an opportunity
to refute the medical opinions of court-appointed experts, and to oth-
erwise adhere to state procedural law for adjudicating Ford claims.
186
Ford claims are unique among ineligibility arguments in that they
are habeas relief issues based only on a prisoner's status at the time of
a potential execution. 187 For that reason, even if a Ford challenge is
successful, some federal appellate courts appear willing to allow the
offender to be medicated into competency sufficient for execution.
188
The more frequent result, however, is a tacit agreement between the
defense and the prosecution not to do anything, and the incompetent
offender effectively serves a life sentence on death row.
C. Rationales Underlying Limits on Habeas Relief and Their
Inapplicability to Death-Ineligibility Claims
I began this Article by describing briefly the two academic
progenitors of modern habeas restrictions, articles by Judge Friendly
and Professor Bator.189 Procedural restrictions on relief and Herrera's
refusal to recognize the cognizability of freestanding crime-innocence
claims represent legislative and judicial attempts to secure a set of in-
terests that concerned these two legal thinkers. I submit that those
interests are not compromised by entertaining the merits either of
gateway or freestanding death-ineligibility claims that are formally de-
faulted, successive, abusive, or untimely.
The two salient features of the habeas claim types that provoked
scholarly, judicial, and legislative responses during the second half of
the twentieth century are that (1) they required relitigation of claims
183 Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 708 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
184 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 959-60.
185 Id. at 949.
186 See id. at 950-52; see also infra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
187 Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998).
188 See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1025-27 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
189 See supra Part I.A.
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decided by a trial jury or available on direct review and (2) they in-
volved factual questions subject to evidentiary decay. Whereas para-
digm ineligibility claims also exhibit those two characteristics, three
out of the four non-paradigm challenges to capital eligibility do not
implicate the interests that the procedural obstacles to relief are de-
signed to secure. As a result, the strain in logic necessary to apply
existing habeas doctrine to certain ineligibility claims has only be-
come apparent recently. Accordingly, courts should formulate a new
response to the unique issues that non-paradigm death-ineligibility
claims pose. 190
I start by unpacking the interests in habeas restrictions articulated
by Judge Friendly and Bator. Judge Friendly argues against the
"broad proposition that collateral attack should always be open for the
asserted denial of a 'constitutional' right, even though this was or
could have been litigated in the criminal trial and on appeal." 191 To
support his argument, he invokes the interest in deterrence, 192 the
diminished ability at a later date to determine the factual issue giving
rise to the claim (sometimes associated with deliberate "sandbagging"
by prisoners) ,193 the inability to retry the defendant if the court grants
190 This statement is subject to the caveat that ineligibility claims that receive a full and
fair trial and direct appellate adudication implicate different interests than do ineligibility
claims that do not receive such treatment.
191 See Friendly, supra note 9, at 154.
192 See id. at 146.
193 See id. at 146-48. Concerns about sandbagging are expressed throughout the Su-
preme Court's habeas procedure cases. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491-92
(1991) ("[H]abeas corpus review may give litigants incentives to withhold claims for ma-
nipulative purposes and may establish disincentives to present claims when evidence is
fresh." (citations omitted)); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) ("[D]efense counsel may
not make a tactical decision to forgo a [claim] . . . and then, when he discovers that the
tactic has been unsuccessful, pursue an alternative strategy in federal court."). The con-
cern arises in several contexts. First, sandbagging may be advantageous when the constitu-
tional claim does not affect the likelihood of acquittal because it does not influence the
jury's fact-finding. DanielJ. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. RE-v.
1128, 1196 (1986). A challenge to the composition of the grand jury is such a case. Id.
Second, sandbagging may be an attractive option when, should the initial conviction be
overturned based on the withheld claim, the state's case in the subsequent trial will be
weaker (for example, due to the unavailability of certain testimony). Id. at 1196-97. And
lastly, when a federal court may be more favorable to the claim, the defense may prefer to
bypass the state court's fact-finding and present an issue directly to the habeas court. Id. at
1197. Professor Meltzer, however, concludes that the likelihood of sandbagging is actually
quite small. See id. at 1199. The pervasiveness of sandbagging is hotly disputed, even on
the Court. Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89 (1977) (noting that defense coun-
sel may deliberately withhold, or sandbag, constitutional claims in a state trial court in
order to later raise the claim in federal habeas court if defense counsel's client is not
acquitted in state trial court), with id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Under the [cur-
rent] regime of collateral review... no rational lawyer would risk the 'sandbagging' feared
by the Court."). Some judges have argued that there is no empirical evidence that it oc-
curs. See Williams v. Lockhart, 862 F.2d 155, 161 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, C.J., concurring)
("To suggest that prisoners might hold back to play procedural games with the court is
unrealistic."). Most habeas petitioners proceed pro se, and sandbagging is not a good
3572010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:329
relief,19 4 the strain on judicial resources, 1 95 and the public interest in
finality. 196 The purposes invoked by courts and legislatures to support
rules against defaulted, successive, abusive, and untimely claims are
almost identical 19 7 and reflect the concerns expressed in Judge
Friendly's article.1
98
Bator, much like Judge Friendly, was concerned with the implica-
tions of allowing relitigation of claims that were fully and fairly adjudi-
cated in trial and appellate proceedings. He directed his attention "to
the problem of finality as it bears on... creating rational institutional
schemes for the administration of the criminal law." 199 Unlike Judge
Friendly, Bator's thrust was that the epistemic limits of human inquiry
rendered "truth" ultimately unknowable and that collateral review of
state adjudication should accordingly be restricted to instances of de-
fective state process. 20 0 The interest in finality, argued Bator, consists
of a number of subsidiary interests: conservation of resources where
relitigation would achieve no improvement in human inquiry, deter-
rence and rehabilitation, and the repose resulting from having tried
hard enough to adjudicate claims accurately. 20 ' Bator's work was
enormously influential and has spawned a half-century of legislative
and judicial activity involving his "full and fair" model of habeas re-
form.20 2 His argument regarding finality and the epistemic limits of
strategy for such litigants. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring
Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 351 (2006).
194 Friendly, supra note 9, at 147.
195 Id. at 148-49. The interest in judicial efficiency is oft-cited in habeas procedural
jurisprudence. See, e.g., McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490-91 (noting that the doctrines control-
ling defaulted and abusive claims "flow[ I from the significant costs of federal habeas
corpus review"); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260 (1973) (Powell,J., concur-
ring) (noting, with respect to a Fourth Amendment claim raised collaterally, that the re-
examination of claims on collateral attack jeopardizes the fair distribution of judicial
resources).
196 See Friendly, supra note 9, at 149. The Supreme Court has invoked the finality
interest in this context many times. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403 (1993)
(freestanding innocence claims); McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490-91 (abusive and defaulted
claims); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 491 (1986) (procedurally defaulted claims); Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-27 (1982) (defaulted claims).
197 See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 490-91 ("The doctrines of procedural default and abuse
of the writ implicate nearly identical concerns flowing from the significant costs of federal
habeas corpus review.").
198 There are actually two ways to frame the argument that Judge Friendly would not
have found death-ineligibility claims objectionable, had they been cognizable in 1970.
First, because a death-ineligibility claim seeks relief that would often preclude imposition
of the same sentence, it does not threaten the interests that concerned him. I discuss this
frame in the text. Second, the exceptions that Judge Friendly specifies strongly suggest
that, had ineligibility claims been cognizable at that time, he would have specified them as
well. See Friendly, supra note 9, at 151-57.
199 Bator, supra note 9, at 446.
200 Id. at 449.
201 Id. at 452-53.
202 Id. at 456-57.
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factfinding forms the intellectual basis of the requirement that habeas
relief issue only to correct "unreasonable" state adjudications, as well
as Herrera decision's refusing to recognize the cognizability of free-
standing innocence claims. 20
3
The critiques of Bator and Judge Friendly were a response to a
particular era of criminal procedure-decisions by the Warren Court
that expanded the scope of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,
applied those rights to state criminal defendants through the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and increased the availabil-
ity of habeas relief to vindicate those rights.20 4 Those critiques, and
the doctrines that reflect them, simply failed to account for the advent
of Eighth Amendment ineligibility challenges that present different
legal questions and implicate different policy interests. The interests
specified in each of those two landmark articles, and repeated fre-
quently by Congress and courts thereafter, cluster generally into two
broad sets of concerns: (1) those associated with relitigating claims
that are either adjudicated or are capable of being adjudicated at trial
and on direct review, and (2) those associated with the evidentiary
decay that takes place before adjudication in a subsequent
proceeding. 2
0 5
1. Relitigation of Claims Adjudicated at Trial
Judge Friendly focused on the relitigation of cases subject to con-
stitutional errors that do not affect the ability of courts to return the
same verdict or to impose the same sentence.20 6 Similarly, Bator
wanted habeas law to account for the epistemic limits of human in-
quiry by imposing restrictions on when one court could collaterally
review the legal and factual determinations of another.20 7
Specifically, both thinkers questioned the prudence of allocating
scarce institutional resources to redundant federal habeas inquiries
(or to habeas review of claims that could have been litigated at trial or
on direct appeal).208 Judge Friendly described the drain on commu-
nity resources as the "most serious single evil" of collateral attack.20 9
203 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993).
204 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
205 Professor Anthony Amsterdam also published a very influential article that parsed
the interest in finality expressed by Bator. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 383-86 (1964).
206 See Friendly, supra note 9, at 155. Judge Friendly's article is actually most con-
cerned with collateral attacks in a "unitary" system-i.e., collateral attacks on conviction by
federal prisoners. Judge Friendly nonetheless cross-applies these concerns to collateral
attacks by state prisoners in Part V of his article. See id. at 164-69.
207 See Bator, supra note 9, at 448.
208 Friendly, supra note 9, at 148; see also Amsterdam, supra note 205, at 383 (specifying
as a concern a "duplication of judicial effort").
209 Friendly, supra note 9, at 148.
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Bator lamented the effect of collateral review on "all of the intellec-
tual, moral, and political resources involved in the legal system."21 0
Both scholars were describing the federal resources necessary to adju-
dicate the habeas petition rather than the state resources necessary to
conduct state criminal process if a federal petition were granted.
Non-paradigm ineligibility claims are not well suited to resource-
based critiques of habeas litigation. First, many such challenges can-
not be litigated at trial or on direct review at all. For example, a Ford
competency claim is premature until an execution is imminent.2 1'
Second, when the Court recognizes an ineligibility category, many
qualifying offenders will already be on death row. For instance, when
the Court decided Roper and Atkins, many juvenile and mentally re-
tarded offenders were already subject to a final conviction and capital
sentence. Third, there are structural reasons to believe that a crucial
assumption of Judge Friendly and Bator-that the inquiries of the
courts conducting trial and collateral proceedings are not subject to
meaningfully different institutional pressures-simply does not hold
in the death-ineligibility context. 21 2 Fourth, most empirical data sug-
gests that procedural bars do not diminish the amount of litigation
necessary to resolve a claim; all that happens is that courts divert re-
sources from merits to procedural questions.21 3 Finally, choking off
habeas review of ineligibility claims could require the Supreme Court
to expend valuable resources on avoiding unconstitutional executions
by scrutinizing claims on its direct review of state collateral
proceedings.
Both Bator and Judge Friendly emphasize an interest in psycho-
logical repose for the offender, a point at which the offender under-
stands that he is "'justly subject to sanction, [and] that he stands in
need of rehabilitation."' 2 14 Rehabilitation cannot begin, the argu-
ment goes, until the offender is subjected to unqualified condemna-
tion that is not open to relitigation. Setting aside the powerful
argument that incarceration does not promote rehabilitation gener-
210 Bator, supra note 9, at 451.
211 See Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998).
212 See Bator, supra note 9, at 451; Friendly, supra note 9, at 146. Indeed, Judge
Friendly expressed disbelief at the notion, only possible in a unitary system, that a judge
might hold his own ruling unconstitutional. See Friendly, supra note 9, at 155.
213 See HABEAS TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 59 (study concluding that overall
disposition time per case has increased since AEDPA's enactment); Steiker, supra note 25,
at 316-17 ("[T]oday's procedural default inquiry[ ] occupies more pages of the U.S. Re-
ports than the Court's consideration of petitioners' underlying substantive claims.").
214 See Friendly, supra note 9, at 146 (quoting Bator, supra note 9, at 452); see also
Amsterdam, supra note 205, at 383 (specifying as a concern the "delay in setting the crimi-
nal proceeding at rest").
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ally,2 15 rehabilitation is irrelevant to death-ineligibility challenges for
another reason. Rehabilitation cannot logically be a penal objective
of a death sentence because that sentence necessarily means that the
capital offender will not ever return to society.
21 6
The implications for finality are different in the death-ineligibility
context. An ineligibility claimant seeks to defeat a capital sentence,
not his conviction. Any damage to finality is only the delay in execu-
tion associated with entertaining nonmeritorious claims. Finality is no
doubt compromised by capital-eligibility challenges, but to a much
lesser degree than with claims that seek new trials.2 17 In many in-
stances, ineligibility challenges will not have been litigated at trial, so
federal habeas review would not constitute "mere relitigation" of a
claim that creates no increment of human inquiry. Even in instances
in which states have decided a claim, there are structural reasons to
believe that federal adjudication may be less susceptible to improper
political pressure.2 1 8 I have already discussed the effect of ineligibility
challenges on deterrence, and the rehabilitation interest invoked by
Bator simply does not apply to offenders who otherwise face capital
punishment. Finally, although society's sense of repose may be dimin-
ished by the state's failure to execute an offender sentenced to death
at trial, the offender remains subject to the severe criminal punish-
ment of a life sentence.
2. Evidentiary Decay
Judge Friendly and Bator both express concerns about evidence
becoming stale over time. This broad concern subdivides into two an-
alytically distinct considerations: (1) that evidence necessary to adjudi-
cate the constitutional claim deteriorates and (2) that an accurate
retrial, should the habeas claim succeed, becomes more difficult. 219 I
consider each in turn.
Judge Friendly in particular argues that federal habeas proceed-
ings cannot accurately adjudicate constitutional inquiries involving ev-
idence that deteriorates over time-he calls the prospect of police
officers remembering for many years which warnings they gave a sus-
215 SeeJack B. Weinstein, The Role ofJudges in a Government of by, and for the People: Notes
for the Fifty-eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 187-88 (2008) (collecting sources).
216 The compromise with rehabilitation that death-ineligibility litigation necessitates is
also lower because the adjudication does not suspend an acknowledgement of responsibil-
ity-it implies nothing about the accuracy of the finding that the offender is a capital
murderer.
217 Moreover, available data suggests that Atkins has not opened any floodgates of frivo-
lous litigation. See Blume et al., supra note 153, at 628.
218 See infra Part III.A.
219 See Friendly, supra note 9, at 147; see also Amsterdam, supra note 205, at 384 (subdi-
viding evidentiary reliability question into question involving constitutional claim and
question involving underlying guilt adjudication).
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pect "chimerical. '" 220 Once again, this argument turns on the type of
constitutional claim involved, and it makes sense when directed at the
types of claims (illegal searches, Miranda violations) that Judge
Friendly critiqued. The argument also makes sense for paradigm inel-
igibility claims, which involve statutorily specified crime aggravators.
Those aggravators often require inquiries into affairs contemporane-
ous with the crime's commission, such as culpability, that a prosecu-
tion proves using the testimony of police officers, the suspect, and
other witnesses whose memories surely fade over time.
Non-paradigm ineligibility challenges, however, do not generally
involve such decaying evidence. 22 1 Roper challenges allege that the of-
fender was a juvenile, and the dispositive evidence neither improves
nor degrades over time. Atkins challenges assert mental retardation
and require assessments of intellectual functioning, adaptive behavior,
and childhood (developmental) onset. 222 The effect of evidentiary
decay on these claims is indeterminate. Although witness recollection
of an offender's childhood deteriorates over time, the developmental-
onset criterion is more often shown by reference to school and medi-
cal records and, in any event, is the least frequently disputed of the
Atkins elements.2 2 3 By contrast, psychometric testing for intellectual
and adaptive deficits improves over time and often provides informa-
tion that was not even available at trial. 224 In Ford competency chal-
lenges, evidence also improves over time, as such challenges involve
psychiatric diagnoses at the point of imminent execution.
In a related criticism, Judge Friendly expressed concern that ro-
bust habeas review would precipitate sandbagging-the strategic deci-
sion not to assert a claim at trial and in direct review proceedings in
hopes of prevailing with weaker evidence and arguments on habeas
review. 225 Over the course of forty years, the Court has expressly and
frequently invoked sandbagging as a rationale for imposing procedu-
ral restrictions. 226 Considerable authority disputes this casual observa-
220 See Friendly, supra note 9, at 147; see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("[While] lapse of time is not necessarily a barrier to a challenge
of the constitutionality of a criminal conviction[,] .... in this case it should be.").
221 Note, however, that habeas review of Tison/Enmund challenges are subject to the
evidentiary decay characterizing paradigm ineligibility claims. See supra Part II.B.1.
222 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
223 See Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge of Implementing Atkins v.
Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of
Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RIcH. L. REv. 811, 854-55 (2007) ("[T]he
developmental onset requirement, though diagnostically essential, does very little work in
the ordinary Atkins adjudication.").
224 Psychiatric professionals who administer IQ and behavioral testing can test for ma-
lingering so that they can spot instances where offenders are "faking it." See id.
225 See Friendly, supra note 9, at 157-59.
226 The sandbagging rationale recurs, for example, throughout the procedural-default
jurisprudence. See supra note 193; see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)
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tion,2 27 particularly for capital-sentencing-phase claims.228  The
concern is particularly misplaced with respect to non-paradigm death-
ineligibility claims. There is, for example, no serious concern that a
prisoner would withhold claims about juvenile status. As for Atkins
claims, a prisoner has no incentive to withhold the claim because (1)
rules for postconviction relief make trial claims far more promising
and (2) evidence of retardation does not deteriorate over time, so a
prisoner does not benefit from delay. For a competency challenge,
there is not even a claim to withhold. Talking in terms of dispersed
witnesses and eroded memories makes little sense in this context, and
the Court has observed that, "unlike the question of guilt or inno-
cence, which becomes more uncertain with time for evidentiary rea-
sons, the issue of sanity is properly considered in proximity to the
execution." 2 29 For non-paradigm ineligibility claims that are now be-
coming litigable, concerns about being able to adjudicate the underly-
ing constitutional violation are, for a variety of reasons, misplaced.
230
The dominant critiques of Warren-era habeas doctrine expressed
concern not only about the decay of evidence necessary to adjudicate
the constitutional claim on habeas review, but also about the decay of
evidence necessary to conduct a new trial should habeas relief issue.
Judge Friendly cynically remarked that, "although successful attack
usually entitles the prisoner only to a retrial, a long delay makes this a
matter of theory only."231 Ineligibility clams, however, never seek re-
lief related to a trial court's guilt finding. Even paradigm ineligibility
claims seek only to have a sentence commuted or to retry capital eligi-
bility. For non-paradigm claims, the relief varies. Simmons claims of
juvenile status are not litigated because the sentences are always com-
muted or vacated in state collateral proceedings. If an Atkins claim
were simply asserted as an innocence gateway for consideration of an-
(noting that the danger of sandbagging does not "vanish[ ] once a trial has ended in con-
viction, since appellate counsel might well conclude that the best strategy is to select a few
promising claims for airing on appeal, while reserving others for federal habeas review
should the appeal be unsuccessful"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 & n.34 (1982)
(recognizing that sometimes "defendant's counsel may deliberately choose to withhold a
claim in order to 'sandbag'").
227 See Meltzer, supra note 193, at 1199; Stevenson, supra note 193, at 351 & n.49.
228 See Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1544, 1577-78 (1983).
229 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 406 (1993).
230 See Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the
Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321, 336-37 (1987-1988)
(arguing that lawyers will always try to maximize their chances of prevailing at the first
stage of litigation); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 897 (1984) ("Given that the
success rate at trial and on appeal, while low, is greater than the success rate on habeas
corpus, the odds are against being able to 'sandbag' in a first procedure and emerge victo-
rious in a second." (footnotes omitted)).
231 Friendly, supra note 9, at 147.
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other constitutional challenge, such as an alleged Brady violation2 32 or
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, then the result could be a
new sentencing proceeding. As a matter of practice, however, the
merits of an exhausted retardation claim almost never go back to state
courts; ultimate Atkins relief is either granted or denied in federal
court. A successful Ford competency challenge does not entitle an of-
fender to a commutation or even to a new sentencing proceeding; the
offender simply may not be put to death without a subsequent finding
that he has become competent to be executed.
Concerns about evidentiary decay are also phrased partially in
terms of their effect on deterrence.23 3 Judge Friendly was concerned
with the sorts of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations that
had little bearing on the guilt of the offender and with procedural
errors that did not affect the outcome of the original proceeding.
234
According to the dominant critiques, the success of these claims re-
quires new trials, diminishes a crime's expected punishment, and
compromises the deterrent effect of criminal law. 235 Relief for proce-
dural challenges might undermine the substantive commands of crim-
inal law, but ineligibility challenges are not procedural. For
meritorious claims, the Court already decided that the Eighth Amend-
ment right asserted dominates any deterrence interest. With certain
questions of capital ineligibility, such as juvenile status, a claim's merit
is clear. In the ineligibility context, the salient deterrence question is
whether potentially nonmeritorious challenges, such as mental retar-
dation and mental incompetence claims, undermine the legal injunc-
tion against murder. I do not engage in a long discussion of this point
here. Suffice it to say that academics hotly dispute whether the death
penalty, as an institution, has any significant deterrent effect 236 and
that the issue of questionably meritorious ineligibility petitions by bor-
232 A Brady violation is a type of due process violation that occurs where the prosecu-
tion suppresses evidence, material to guilt or sentencing, that is favorable to the accused.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
233 Friendly, supra note 9, at 146 (citing Bator, supra note 9, at 452).
234 Id. at 155-56.
235 See Amsterdam, supra note 205, at 389 ("As the exclusionary rule is applied time
after time, it seems that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of diminishing
returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a public nuisance."); Bator,
supra note 9, at 452 ("[The deterrent power of criminal sanctions is] undermined [when]
we so define the processes leading to just punishment that it can really never be finally
imposed at all.").
236 See, e.g.,JohnJ. Donohue &Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 841 (2005) (concluding that whereas the deter-
rent effect of the death penalty remains uncertain, capital punishment does not signifi-
cantly influence homicide rates). In the recent Supreme Court case involving the
constitutionality of lethal injection, Justice Stevens compiled significant authority on both
sides of this question. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1547 n.13 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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derline retarded or incompetent offenders exists on such a periphery
that mounting deterrence arguments are, without further data,
unconvincing.
Concerns about deteriorating evidence are no doubt valid, but
they obviously play out differently depending on the specific type of
claim at issue. And for non-paradigm ineligibility claims, which are
the challenges that I argue justify deviation from the normal habeas
rules, major concerns about evidentiary deterioration are for the most
part misplaced.
D. The Limits of Crime Innocence
The scholarship that ultimately prompted various types of reme-
dial restrictions was written before habeas could even be used as a
remedy for Eighth Amendment eligibility violations. 237 Controlling
ineligibility law is an almost accidental byproduct of rules created to
restrict excessive procedural litigation and freestanding innocence
claims.
Even though ineligibility began to mature as a concept while the
Court and Congress winnowed various innocence gateways, the only
ineligibility claims cognizable on habeas review were paradigm claims,
which fit neatly into the relitigation critiques that animated the rele-
vant restrictions. Sawyer claims-claims that there are no statutory ag-
gravators-called upon federal courts to pass upon questions that had
been decided at trial. Moreover, paradigm claims were subject to the
same evidentiary decay as were most Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amend-
ment claims that prompted the habeas restrictions, as well as the
crime-innocence claims that were considered in Herrera.
In 1996, certain procedural gateways were legislatively narrowed,
and others were not. The Supreme Court had previously held that
the gateways for defaulted and abusive claims were to be the same, but
AEDPA appears to asymmetrically restrict abusive death-ineligibility
challenges. For successive, abusive, and untimely death-ineligibility
claims, AEDPA appears to foreclose habeas relief, even though Con-
gress almost certainly had only paradigm ineligibility claims in mind.
237 1 want to flag another interest that the Bator/Friendly critiques invoke but that I do
not discuss here: comity, a federalism interest in deference to state criminal process. Some
emphasize that a guilt determination is the central purpose of state criminal adjudication,
and that allowing federal courts to revisit that question therefore slights state judiciaries.
See 1 FHCPP, supra note 20, § 2.5; 2 id. § 28.4. Others frame the issue in terms of the
superior expertise of state courts in defining state offenses, as well as in applying rules of
evidence and procedure. See Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of Innocence for
Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 943, 1010 (1994). Ineligibil-
ity challenges implicate state criminal adjudication, but not to the extent that pure proce-
dural or crime-innocence claims do. They do not necessarily implicate state procedure,




This situation will, I argue, ultimately force the Court to consider a
habeas question that it would prefer to avoid: whether the Constitu-
tion (rather than a statute or the common law) requires that the writ
issue to thwart an execution that the Eighth Amendment forbids.
This question is less likely to be presented starkly under crime-inno-
cence litigation because states do not try to execute offenders who
they know did not commit murder. In his Herrera concurrence, Jus-
tice Scalia openly remarked that, " [w] ith any luck, we shall avoid ever
having to face this embarrassing question again, since it is improbable
that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires
would fail to produce an executive pardon." 238 States do appear will-
ing, however, to proceed with executions of offenders who are death
ineligible.239 In these cases, habeas relief may issue to prevent the
execution, but claims often appear in procedurally defective petitions
that courts may not consider under many readings of the statute. The
Court will have to confront the embarrassing question that concerned
Justice Scalia, albeit in a slightly different context than he envisioned.
III
TOWARD A COHERENT DEATH-INELIGIBILrIY DOCTRINE
If Part II is broadly about policy, then this Part is broadly about
doctrine-specifically, how courts can reconfigure habeas law to ac-
commodate the different issues that ineligibility challenges present. I
contend that the Supreme Court may invoke the interpretive canon of
constitutional avoidance, as well as its unique equitable authority over
the writ, in order to entertain meritorious ineligibility claims without
respect to any procedural defects in the petition containing it.
This Part proceeds in three subparts. The first explains why state
institutions inadequately protect the Eighth Amendment rights of in-
eligible offenders. The second explains that, unlike with crime-inno-
cence claims, an offender asserting death ineligibility
uncontroversially states a claim cognizable under the habeas statute.
The third argues that, in light of constitutional issues that ineligibility
claims present, federal courts may functionally interpret AEDPA to
prevent a state from executing death ineligible offenders.
A. The Ineffectiveness of State Remedies
One of the central conceits of modern habeas law is the suffi-
ciency of state process. The exhaustion requirement, the tolling of
the federal limitations statute during the pendency of state postcon-
viction proceedings, and the procedural default doctrine are all de-
238 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
239 See, e.g., Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2007) (Atkins claim).
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signed to promote the primacy of state criminal adjudication. There
is no reason to believe, the argument goes, that state courts are not
perfectly well suited to determine guilt and capital eligibility, or to
adjudicate procedural challenges in direct criminal and postconvic-
tion proceedings. 240 If state trials, postconviction review, and clem-
ency procedure can ensure that states do not execute ineligible
offenders, then one might argue that there is no need to worry about
how federal habeas law affects these claimants. Unfortunately, state
process is unlikely to protect adequately the rights of such offenders.
1. Trial
The first stage of state criminal process at which a state may avert
the execution of a death-ineligible offender is at trial. By "trial" I
mean all proceedings that a trial entails, including the decision
whether to charge a defendant capitally. 241 It includes both the guilt
and the sentencing phases of a capital case as well as any pretrial
hearings.
The efficacy of state trial process depends on the type of ineligi-
bility at issue. Only certain types of death-ineligibility claims can even
be determined at trial. For example, a Ford claim that a prisoner is
not competent for execution is premature before execution is immi-
nent. Prosecutors are unlikely even to seek the death penalty for juve-
nile offenders. On the other hand, prisoners with viable paradigm
ineligibility claims,2 42 as well as those with non-paradigm Atkins and
Tison claims, will often face the capital charges.
Mindful of these differences, there are several reasons to be skep-
tical about how well state trials protect ineligibility claims. First, trials
are inherently incapable of protecting the rights of offenders with pre-
mature ineligibility claims, such as those involving an offender's com-
petence to be executed. Second, even for categories of offenders for
whom the eligibility question is theoretically fixed at trial, the Su-
preme Court may not have yet recognized the relevant constitutional
claim. For instance, a number of offenders already on death row were
ineligible under Simmons and Atkins when those cases were decided in
2005 and 2002, respectively. Third, the tests that certain states apply
240 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411-13 (discussing clemency as an avenue of review); id. at
428 (Scalia, J., concurring).
241 A paradigm ineligibility claim will by definition be disputed at the sentencing phase
(it takes the form of a defense to statutory aggravators). Ordinarily, a mental-retardation
claim will be determined before trial, although in some jurisdictions an offender may raise
the issue during sentencing. SeeTobolowsky, supra note 150, at 112. The determination is
sequenced this way to prevent evidence introduced at trial from prejudicing the jury's as-
sessment of mental retardation. See id. at 113. The burden of persuasion and standard of
proof vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See id. at 118-19.
242 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
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to ineligibility claims deviate significantly from the standards, often
clinical, that federal courts use.24 3 These state tests, often for psychiat-
ric phenomena, almost always disqualify fewer offenders than do fed-
eral standards, and they risk sentences that are simply erroneous
under federal law. 244 Finally, even if a certain type of ineligibility
claim is brought at trial, local political pressures that are absent in a
federal forum may exist in state capital proceedings. 245 These pres-
sures are familiar: state judges are generally either appointed by
elected governors or are elected themselves, and in many death-pen-
alty jurisdictions, rules against executing certain categories of offend-
ers may be very unpopular. 246 The result is twofold. First, juries may
pretextually decide that a prisoner on the margin is death eligible be-
cause they do not like the idea of categorical exemptions. 247 Second,
at least one study has concluded that elected state judges in states with
public support for the death penalty are less likely to set aside capital
sentences than are their appointed federal counterparts sitting in the
same territorial jurisdictions.
248
2. State Postconviction Review
After a defendant's conviction becomes final on direct review, the
federal exhaustion rule requires state prisoners to pursue state post-
conviction remedies before seeking federal habeas relief, and the fed-
eral statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of that
exhaustion. 249 During state proceedings, death-ineligible offenders
are often subject to systemic or idiosyncratic state procedural bars.
250
One of the most glaring problems with the proposition that state
collateral proceedings can sufficiently protect death-ineligible offend-
ers is the fact that there is no federal right (either constitutional or
statutory) to a lawyer during state postconviction review.251 That pro-
cess is notoriously complex, and capital prisoners are woefully ill
243 See Part II.B.3, supra.
244 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 141, at 728-29; Franklin E. Zimring, The Unexam-
ined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the Model Penal Code, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1396, 1409 (2005). Those rulings are nonetheless left undisturbed because, under the
federal habeas statute, decisions need only be "reasonable" determinations of fact and in-
terpretations of law to withstand federal habeas scrutiny. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).
245 See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REv. 283,
293-336 (2008) (discussing the institutional pressures on state officials responsible for im-
plementing the death penalty).
246 See id. at 328-31.
247 See Tobolowsky, supra note 150, at 109-10.
248 Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods and Capital Punishment in the
American States, in RUNNING FORJUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANcIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 186, 199 (MathewJ. Streb ed., 2007).
249 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); id. § 2254(b).
250 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 141, at 728-29.
251 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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equipped to navigate it pro se. Even if a prisoner does secure counsel
during state postconviction proceedings, there is no mechanism to en-
sure that such representation is constitutionally adequate. The fed-
eral statute of limitations is not tolled during the preparation of state
postconviction applications. 252
There are also problems associated with claims, such as those cre-
ated by Atkins and Roper, that would not have been cognizable during
the first round of a prisoner's state postconviction proceedings. Pris-
oners lose meritorious claims in state postconviction litigation because
they run afoul of limitations statutes, peculiar pleading requirements,
and a variety of other procedural obstacles-even if the claim was not
adjudicated at trial or on direct appeal. 253
Moreover, familiar political pressures undermine postconviction
adjudication. In fact, such pressures can be more influential because
overturning a sentence on state postconviction review often requires
the ruling of a judge rather than the verdict of a jury.2 54 The vast
majority of state judges are elected and are less likely than an ap-
pointed counterpart to overturn a capital conviction. 255 Atkins and
Ford adjudication therefore embodies the problems with state postcon-
viction process.
State Atkins litigation has been problematic since the federal stat-
ute of limitations began to run when the Supreme Court decided At-
kins on June 20, 2002.256 Mentally retarded death-row offenders then
had a year to file their federal petitions, with the limitations period
tolled during the pendency of state postconviction proceedings, but
not during the preparation of applications for state postconviction re-
lief. Prisoners must navigate that convoluted process without the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. As I explained in Part II.B.3, the
252 See 1 FHCPP, supra note 20, § 5.2b(ii).
253 See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
254 See 1 FHCPP, supra note 20, § 3.5; Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death
Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges is Indispensable to
Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1808-09 (2000) (finding that elected
judges must decide between losing reelection and conducting fair postconviction review).
See generally Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on theJudiciay: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts
to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308
(1997) (describing two political campaigns to remove state supreme court judges from
office because of their unpopular decisions in death-penalty cases).
255 See Brace & Boyea, supra note 248; see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death
Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 465, 488 (1999)
(finding that "partisan election ofjudges correlates with death penalty affirmance" in some
states); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Be-
tween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 776-79, 784
(1995) (noting that "campaigning for the death penalty and against judges who overturn
capital cases [is] an effective tactic" for judges running for office).
256 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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offender's Atkins claim usually requires a pro-bono attorney who must
pour through the trial record for evidence of retardation, conduct
interviews, secure releases for medical and prison records (a process
that alone takes many months), and find a mental health professional
to perform gratis the intellectual and adaptive testing necessary to file
a litigable Atkins claim. The limitations period runs during this entire
process, and capital prisoners frequently end up filing untimely fed-
eral petitions. Pleading requirements in many death-penalty states are
onerous, and meritorious but formally defective Atkins claims often
run afoul of some other state procedural rule. Even if Atkins claim-
ants obtain review on the merits in state court, that process runs an
unusually high risk of constitutional error for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding that granting a postconviction Atkins claim may be particularly
unpopular in many death-penaltyjurisdictions. 257 Moreover, in order
to adjudicate cognitive functioning during postconviction proceed-
ings, at least some states allow the introduction of extraordinarily prej-
udicial trial evidence regarding the crime's heinousness.
258
Adjudication of Ford claims similarly exemplifies the pitfalls of
state postconviction process, the sufficiency of which was at issue in
Panetti.259 Notwithstanding Panetti's multiple motions, the state court
refused to transcribe its proceedings, 260 and it repeatedly provided
him information that was not true.261 On at least one occasion, it pro-
vided an important notice to the state and not to Panetti, and, as a
more general matter, it failed to notify him of his right to present his
case. 262 Moreover, the state court failed to provide a competency
hearing. 263 Finally, the state court unconstitutionally denied Panetti
the opportunity to rebut evidence submitted by court-appointed ex-
perts.264 The Supreme Court ultimately granted relief,265 but Panetti
exposed serious problems with the way state postconviction process
addresses competency determinations.
3. Clemency
The most frequently invoked argument, and one relied on heav-
ily by Herrera, for the sufficiency of state corrective process involves the
257 See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
258 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 141, at 727-28 (identifying Alabama and Texas as
two jurisdictions that have sought to highlight gruesome facts of an offender's crime dur-
ing the inquiry into the offender's mental retardation).
259 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).




264 Id. at 951.
265 Id. at 962.
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availability of clemency.26 6 Clemency authority includes the power to
commute sentences, a result similar to the relief sought by ineligibility
claimants. 267 The power usually vests in a governor, although in some
states the governor shares it with an executive-appointed administra-
tive board. 268 Unlike judicial process, clemency lacks both formalized
procedure and substantive standards. As Professor Vivian Berger has
observed, the system's structural virtues are its vices. 269 The absence
of red tape means that there are no procedural safeguards, 270 and the
lack of substantive standards means that clemency may be denied for
any reason.2 71 Judicial review is not available for a clemency
decision. 27
2
The argument that clemency is a safety valve for failures in ineligi-
bility adjudication contains serious problems. To begin with, as
judges and juries have meted out more capital sentences, the use of
clemency has declined. 273 Because clemency power vests either in a
governor or in a board appointed by the governor, the decision
whether to commute a sentence occurs in the most political climate
imaginable. 274 The calculus necessarily involves a number of factors
other than the constitutional claim's merit: the lawyers' political affili-
ations and ambitions, the status of the victim's family,275 the proximity
to a gubernatorial election, 276 and the perception that a governor is
too soft on crime.277 Further, some commentators argue that men-
tally ill and mentally retarded offenders fare particularly poorly in
clemency proceedings. 278
Although fraught with less procedural peril than trial and the
postconviction remedial process, the political distortions affecting ad-
judication are even more exaggerated when introduced into clemency
determinations. Taken together, the three major state channels for
266 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-16 (1993).
267 See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the
King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 577 (1991).
268 See Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its
Structure, 89 VA. L. REV. 239, 255 (2003). In a subset of the states where authority is shared,
the board is the dominant decision maker. Id. at 256.
269 Berger, supra note 237, at 967.
270 Id. at 967 (citing Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MICH L. REV. 1643,
1699-1700 (1993)).
271 Id.; see Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan, Execu-
tive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1326 (2004).
272 See Heise, supra note 268, at 252; Sarat & Hussain, supra note 271.
273 See Heise, supra note 268, at 250; Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the Gate: Capital
Clemency in the United States from Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 349, 353-55 (2003).
274 See Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 61, 87-88 (2003).
275 Id. at 88.
276 Id.; see Heise, supra note 268, at 291.
277 Rosen, supra note 274, at 88; see Rapaport, supra note 273, at 369.
278 See Rapaport, supra note 273, at 365 (citations omitted).
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offenders to seek relief for death ineligibility fail to ensure that such
relief actually issues to qualified claimants.
B. Death Ineligibility as a Constitutional Claim
One of the recurrent questions explored in modern habeas law
and commentary is whether a freestanding crime-innocence chal-
lenge-one that does not supplement another constitutional claim-
is even cognizable on habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) provides
that "[t] he writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner un-
less . . . [h] e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." Similarly, § 2254(a) restricts relief for
state prisoners to claims that they are "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."
Courts and commentators have struggled to persuasively frame
freestanding crime-innocence challenges as constitutional claims.
And if the claim is not capable of constitutional phrasing, then it is
arguably not cognizable under the habeas statute. The more vocal
critics of crime-innocence theories describe such challenges as at-
tempts to constitutionalize new trial motions. 279 These critics would
argue that no constitutional provision requires an offender whose
guilt has been determined beyond some threshold of certainty to ob-
tain a federal forum to retest his conviction when guilt seems less
probable. 280 In Herrera, the Supreme Court conspicuously refused to
affirm the cognizability of a freestanding crime-innocence claim at
least partially for this reason.281
My introductory discussion of the concept in Part I.B actually dis-
tinguishes between two freestanding innocence questions, and that
distinction in part explains why freestanding analysis is different for
ineligibility claims. The difference is roughly that between the ques-
tions of (1) whether a claim states a constitutional violation cogniza-
ble under the habeas statute and (2) whether the constitution
compels a habeas remedy for the stated constitutional violation. Her-
rera muddles these two questions because, for crime-innocence claims,
the answer to both is unclear. For death-ineligibility claims, however,
279 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 407-08 (1993).
280 See id. at 404-05.
281 Id.; see supra Part I.B; see also David R. Dow et al., Is It Constitutional to Execute Someone
Who Is Innocent (and If It Isn't, How Can It Be Stopped Following House v. Bell)?, 42 TULSA L.
REV. 277, 277 (2006) ("We begin with a question that might seem ridiculous: does the
Constitution prohibit the execution of someone who is actually innocent? Remarkably,
this question remains open."); Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the
Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2313, 2358 (2007) ("When a district court is con-
vinced that a state prisoner is innocent but that the prisoner's trial and sentencing pro-
ceedings were constitutionally unobjectionable. ... it is not at all clear that the Supreme
Court would permit the district court to award the habeas remedy on the strength of the
prisoner's innocence alone.").
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only the latter, remedial question is salient. Nobody seriously disputes
that the offender is stating a constitutional claim under the Eighth
Amendment.28 2 Because freestanding ineligibility theories do not
force courts to decide whether freestanding crime-innocence chal-
lenges are statutorily cognizable, the controlling law is (perhaps
counterintuitively) more amenable to those claims.
1. Theories of Freestanding Crime Innocence
Freestanding innocence theories have been a dead end for capi-
tal claimants. Data released in 2008 and spanning twenty years shows
that, of 133 selected offenders exonerated by DNA evidence, not one
was granted relief on a freestanding actual innocence claim. 283 An-
other study reported in 2005 found that, in 178 cases in which actual
innocence was asserted, no court issued a habeas writ on that
ground. 28 4 Although Herrera did not formally bar such claims, its fail-
ure to recognize their cognizability has had roughly the same practical
effect.
28 5
Perhaps an exchange during oral argument in Herrera best reveals
how deeply federal and state parties oppose the idea that freestanding
crime-innocence challenges state a constitutional claim. The State
was asked, "Suppose [there was] a video tape which conclusively shows
the person is innocent and you have a state which as a matter of policy
or law or both simply does not hear new evidence claims in its clem-
ency proceeding. Is there a Federal constitutional violation in your
282 This point actually has different implications for claims that seek relitigation of a
trial finding that an offender is death eligible. One might describe a freestanding ineligi-
bility petition stating such a claim as an attempt to "constitutionalize" a new trial motion
for the sentencing phase of capital proceedings. See infra Part III.B.2.
283 See Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 11, at 99 tbl.6, 112.
284 See Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy ofHerrera v. Collins,
42 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 121, 133-36 (2005) (pointing out that in ninety-one cases, federal
courts refused to recognize a bare claim of innocence; in thirty-three cases, federal courts
assumed that a bare innocence claim existed arguendo and held that petitioner did not
meet the requisite showing; and in fifty-four cases, federal courts recognized the bare inno-
cence claim but held that petitioner failed to meet the required standard).
285 Id. The Ninth Circuit recognizes freestanding innocence. See Osborne v. Dist.
Att'y's Office for the ThirdJud. Dist., 521 F.3d 1118, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2008); Carriger v.
Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). Of the remaining courts of appeal, all but the
Second and the D.C. Circuits concluded, with varying caveats (usually involving capital
prisoners), that such claims are not generally cognizable. See Foster v. Quarterman, 466
F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 2006); Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2004);Johnson
v. Bett, 349 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir. 2003); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2003)
(en banc); Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 482 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343,
347-48 (1st Cir. 2003); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11 th Cir. 2002); Burton v.




view?" 2 8 6 The State's Attorney simply answered, "No, Your Honor,
there is not.
287
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, em-
phasized in her Herrera concurrence that the Court had actually failed
to decide "whether federal courts may entertain convincing claims of
actual innocence." 288 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, in conjunc-
tion with Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas (who would have found
that freestanding crime innocence is not a constitutional claim), and
with Chief Justice Rehnquist (who only assumed such a claim existed
arguendo), formed a five-Justice majority that was unprepared to de-
clare freestanding crime-innocence claims cognizable on habeas
review.
Justices Scalia and Thomas took a view more consistent with that
of Bator 28 9 and believed the question is not whether a prisoner is in-
nocent, but whether there exists "in the Constitution a right to de-
mand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of
innocence brought forward after conviction. '" 290 Understanding why
death-ineligibility challenges sidestep this debate first requires under-
standing the constitutional provisions that freestanding crime-inno-
cence challenges usually invoke: the Eighth Amendment's bar on
.cruel and unusual punishment,291 as well as the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protections for substantive and procedural due process.
29 2
The Eighth Amendment theory, emphasized in Justice Black-
mun's Herrera dissent, is a "greater includes the lesser" argument that,
somewhat ironically, emphasizes the constitutional cognizability of
286 Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (No. 91-
7328), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992 91_7328/argument/
(last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
287 Id.
288 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
289 SeeJoseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's
Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817, 819
(1993) ("Herrera tests the bounds of the Court's determination to stick with a process-
oriented approach to the Eighth Amendment."). In a separate opinion in Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277 (1992),Justice O'Connor rejected Bator's "full and fair" interpretation of pre-
Brown habeas jurisprudence. See id. at 298-301 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
290 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
291 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 274, at 108 (stating Eighth Amendment argument).
292 See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407 n.6 ("This issue is properly analyzed only in terms
of procedural due process."); id. at 435 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) ("The majority's discus-
sion misinterprets petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment claim as raising a procedural,
rather than a substantive, due process challenge." (footnote omitted)); Berger, supra note
237, at 949-50 (arguing that the Constitution mandates state procedures for actual inno-
cence claims); Rosen, supra note 274, at 108-09 (stating substantive due process argu-
ment). The In re Davis concurrence does not specify which constitutional provisions would
be violated if an innocent offender were executed. See In re Davis, No. 08-1443, 2009 WL
2486475, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2009). I do not discuss the Suspension Clause issue at this
time because it is relevant primarily to the remedial question, not to whether crime-inno-
cence challenges state a constitutional claim.
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death-ineligibility claims. 293 If it is cruel and unusual under Tison and
Edmund to execute certain felony murderers, he reasoned, then the
Eighth Amendment obviously bars a state from executing someone
who is actually innocent.
294
The second major theory supporting the cognizability of free-
standing innocence claims involves substantive due process. In fact, in
his Herrera dissent, Justice Blackmun chided the majority for failing to
conduct a substantive due process inquiry. 295 Under such a challenge,
a claimant must show that the state action imposes "arbitrary imposi-
tions and purposeless restraints. "296 The essential argument is that
the execution of an innocent person "shocks the conscience.
'" 297
The final major theory that freestanding crime-innocence claims
are cognizable under the Constitution is premised on procedural due
process.29 8  Herrera expressly framed the prisoner's Fourteenth
Amendment argument in procedural due process terms. 299 The
Court held that the availability of new trial motions and clemency pro-
ceedings alleviated any concern that states provide insufficient process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.300 Herrera seems to have signaled
the Court's potential receptivity to this theory where it considers state
process deficient, although no actual innocence claim has ever suc-
ceeded on this ground.
3 0 1
2. Cognizability of Freestanding Ineligibility Claims
In contrast to freestanding crime-innocence challenges, a death-
ineligibility claim plainly seeks relief under the Eighth Amend-
293 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 431, 432 & n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 431.
295 See id. at 435-36.
296 Id. at 436 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848
(1992) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961))).
297 Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (quoting Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952))); see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846 (1998). The prisoner in Osborne made this argument with respect to his postconviction
access-to-DNA-evidence claim. See Brief for the Respondent at 42-44, Dist. Att'y's Office
for the ThirdJud. Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (No. 08-6).
298 See Berger, supra note 237, at 1021-22; Larry May & Nancy Viner, Actual Innocence
and Manifest Injustice, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 481, 490-91 (2005). In Osborne, the prisoner
argued that procedural due process requires postconviction disclosure of potentially excul-
patory DNA evidence. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 297, at 39-41.
299 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407 n.6.
300 See id. at 407-17.
301 In Osborne, the District Attorney's Office contended that freestanding innocence
was not a Fourteenth Amendment claim. See Brief for Petitioners at 19 n.8, 40-49, Dist.
Att'y's Office for the ThirdJud. Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (No. 08-6). The
District Attorney's Office treated the Fourteenth Amendment challenge primarily as a pro-
cedural due process question. See id. at 44-50.
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ment.3 0 2 The Court has stated that the writ may issue to correct con-
stitutional violations that arise at the time of execution.3 0 3 Under
Roper and Atkins, juvenile status claims and mental retardation claims
are cognizable under the Eighth Amendment.30 4 Under Ford and
Panetti,3 0 5 the cognizable event that violates the Eighth Amendment is
the imminent execution of an incompetent offender. Because courts
may grant relief on procedurally sound ineligibility challenges, a pris-
oner need not supplement such claims with the allegation of another
constitutional violation.
A small subset of ineligibility challenges, appearing in a certain
procedural posture, present constitutional issues resembling those
that freestanding crime-innocence claims create. In situations where
ineligibility claims are decided at trial, one might argue, the claimant
arrives at the federal courthouse legally death eligible, asserting a con-
stitutional right to a federal forum in which he may introduce evi-
dence tending to disprove his eligibility. There are a few responses to
this point. First, the offender still arguably states a challenge under
the Eighth Amendment, making the claim cognizable under the
habeas statute.3 0 6 Second, the offender may still allege a procedural
due process violation, and ineligibility determinations lack the proce-
dural protections that generally support deference to state guilty ver-
dicts. There is no right to a jury finding of eligibility, or a
requirement that the state prove eligibility beyond a reasonable
doubt.3 0 7 Most importantly, there is no presumption of ineligibility,
analogous to a presumption of innocence, that a state must overcome.
States lack any historic expertise, subject to substantive and procedu-
ral restrictions imposed by the U.S. Constitution, in adjudicating
death eligibility. As a result, even trial ineligibility determinations may
be challenged as constitutional violations.
The upshot is that freestanding death-ineligibility claims are eas-
ier to resolve than are freestanding crime-innocence claims. Free-
standing crime-innocence claims implicate two difficult-to-resolve
questions-whether the claim is "constitutional" and therefore cogni-
302 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 406 ("Because Ford's claim went to a matter of punish-
ment-not guilt-it was properly examined within the purview of the Eighth
Amendment.").
303 See id. at 433 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Both Uohnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578
(1988)] and [Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)] recognize that capital defendants
may be entitled to further proceedings because of an intervening development even
though they have been validly convicted and sentenced to death.").
304 See supra Part II.B.2 and Part Il.B.3.
305 See supra Part II.B.4.
306 See supra text accompanying note 279.
307 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 141, at 724-28 (describing the lack of procedural
safeguards governing the determination of mental retardation in state courts, and arguing
that they undermine the substantive Eighth Amendment right of Atkins claimants).
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zable under the habeas statute and, if so, whether the Constitution
also compels a habeas remedy. Death-ineligibility claims, by contrast,
usually struggle only with the second question. Because death-ineligi-
bility claims can be framed straightforwardly either as violations of the
Eighth Amendment bar on cruel and unusual punishment or the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of procedural due process, courts
will not need to confront some of the most vexing questions
presented in freestanding crime-innocence cases.
30 8
C. Configuring Relief
The salient ineligibility question involves how courts and Con-
gress may limit habeas as a remedy for state violations. Habeas law is,
after all, replete with rules that frustrate relief for meritorious claims.
Petitions can be technically defective because they are defaulted, suc-
cessive, abusive, or untimely. 30 9 I commit the balance of this Article to
the question of whether habeas relief may issue to prevent executions
of death-ineligible offenders with procedurally defective claims.
The answer to that question depends on two others: (1) whether
the Court would be willing to hold that state offenders have a constitu-
tional entitlement to a federal habeas forum to test ineligibility claims;
and (2) if not, whether the Court would be willing and able to read a
death-ineligibility exception into existing statutory and common law
procedural restrictions. I submit that the Court is unlikely to actually
constitutionalize entitlement to the habeas remedy,3 10 but that it may
nonetheless avoid unconstitutional executions by interpreting habeas
rules in favor of ineligible claimants whose challenges appear in pro-
cedurally defective petitions. By invoking its historically broad equita-
ble authority over the habeas writ, the Court may even construe
AEDPA so as to avoid problems under the Suspension Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Most federal procedural obstacles contain exceptions for "inno-
cence" but vary in both the source of authority for the exception
(common law versus statute) and the exception's wording.311 Creat-
ing functional death-ineligibility gateways will therefore involve very
different interpretive steps depending on the defect involved. For
cases in which the procedural defect is statutory, the courts' equitable
308 Also worth mentioning is the fact that recognizing the cognizability of a crime-
innocence claim in a capital case would probably suggest the cognizability of crime-inno-
cence claims in noncapital cases. There is no such "slippery slope" in the ineligibility con-
text because an ineligibility claim requires a prior determination that a category of
offenders is exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment.
309 See supra Part I.A.
310 That is, the Court is not likely to declare that restrictions on the writ's availability
for meritorious death-ineligibility claims are unconstitutional.
311 See supra Part I.A.
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authority over the exceptions is obviously diminished. Nonetheless,
federal courts appear willing, at least in certain instances, to conduct a
form of constitutional avoidance to preserve merits consideration of
colorable crime-innocence claims. 312 They should be willing to prac-
tice such avoidance for colorable death-ineligibility challenges as well,
and the Supreme Court has already done so in at least one major
case.
3 13
1. Common Law Bars
The Court has historically emphasized its unusually broad equita-
ble power over the writ's function in a variety of contexts, 314 and it
continues to do so today.315 The Court's willingness to exercise that
power is greatest when the procedural defect is a pure creature of
common law, as is the case with procedural default. Recall that an
offender procedurally defaults a claim if a state court had an adequate
and independent state ground for rejecting it.316 Petitioners may "by-
pass" the procedural obstacle either by showing cause and prejudice
or by demonstrating that the sentence will result in a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice."31 7  The fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice
gateway, like the procedural default for which it furnishes an excep-
tion, remains subject to equitable definition.
318
The Court may easily adapt this pure common law framework to
new types of ineligibility claims, and it has already recognized that ex-
ception for otherwise-defective paradigm challenges.31 9 As I ex-
312 Others have not called this "avoidance" but have noted that the Court has consist-
ently sidelined statutory restrictions on its jurisdiction by invoking its equitable authority
over the writ. See Steiker, supra note 25, at 309 (noting that the Court has used "court-
identified equitable principles .... [to] ignore[ ] statutory language in determining the
availability of a habeas forum."). The Court has held more generally that it must "construe
a federal statute to avoid constitutional questions where such a construction is reasonably
possible." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974) (citations omitted).
313 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943-45 (2007) (rejecting a reading of
AEDPA that would categorically bar successive petitions in favor of an interpretation fa-
vored by pre-statutory case law). In its October 2009 term, the Court has granted certiorari
on another case that calls for it to adopt a restrictive understanding of what constitutes a
"successive" petition in order to avoid executing a potentially death ineligible offender. See
Magwood v. Culliver, 555 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3083 (Nov.
16, 2009) (No. 09-158).
314 See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (recognizing the Court's "'historic
willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ, even where the
statutory language authorizing judicial action has remained unchanged'" (quoting Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977))); Steiker, supra note 25, at 342.
315 See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006) (emphasizing that the Court-cre-
ated injustice exceptions for procedurally defaulted claims control the habeas-relief
inquiry).
316 See supra Part I.A.1.
317 See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
318 See id.
319 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 347-50 (1992); supra Part II.A.
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plained in Part I.A. 1, the originating procedural default cases, related
evidentiary default law, and the interpretation of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 52(b) (where the same language also appears) all
indicate that the miscarriage-of-justice gateway encompasses more
than just crime innocence, particularly in death cases. In Carrier,
320
the Court expressly held that the "miscarriage ofjustice" standard may
be used to grant habeas relief to petitioners who are "actually inno-
cent," and in Sawyer it held that the term "actual innocence" includes
paradigm death ineligibility.3 2 1 Because procedural default is not de-
fined by statute, federal courts face few barriers in adapting these




Although most procedural obstacles (the statute of limitations ex-
cepted) originated as common law doctrines, many of them have, over
time, been codified in Title 28 of the U.S. Code.3 23 When faced with a
statutory obstacle to a meritorious ineligibility claim, a court would
have three choices: (a) declare the provision unconstitutional per se;
(b) hold it unconstitutional as applied; or (c) read the statute, pursu-
ant to some interpretive convention, so as to avert state executions
that violate the Constitution. What emerges from scrutiny of the juris-
prudence is that, while the Supreme Court is unlikely to declare any
statutory bar per se unconstitutional, or even unconstitutional as ap-
plied, it has, despite enjoying less authority to modify procedural bars
imposed by statute than those imposed by common law, 3 2 4 shown a
unique inclination to ignore the plain import of statutory restrictions
that frustrate equitable discretion to decide habeas cases.
3 25
I argue that the Supreme Court could conduct a form of constitu-
tional avoidance (perhaps using the Suspension Clause) that might
permit consideration of ineligibility claims irrespective of any statutory
defects in the petitions containing them. My discussion will focus
heavily on two statutory restrictions: limits on successive and abusive
claims contained in § 2244(b) and the statute of limitations contained
in § 2244(d). These are the two most significant procedural provi-
320 477 U.S. at 495-96.
321 See 505 U.S. at 347-50.
322 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
323 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006) (restricting successive and abusive petitions);
id. § 2254(e) (2) (restricting evidentiary hearings).
324 See infra Part III.C.2(a).
325 See infra Part III.C.2(c).
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sions obstructing merits consideration, 326 and together they present
an important contrast between a provision that has a common law
antecedent and one that does not.
a. Per Se Challenges
The biggest problem with arguments seeking per se invalidation
of procedural obstacles is the Suspension Clause doctrine in which the
facial challenges are rooted. 327 The Suspension Clause states that "the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it."' 328 Suspension Clause jurisprudence is notoriously confusing,3 29
and even the fiercest death-penalty opponents concede that the
Clause's unusual phrasing, which bars suspension of the writ without
vesting it,330 creates questions about who may seek and how Congress
may constitutionally restrict relief
331
The modern inquiry's touchstone is whether a collateral remedy
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of a prisoner's deten-
tion. 33 2 As to restrictions on successive petitions, Felker v. Turpin
333
held that § 2244(b) did not per se violate the Suspension Clause.3 34
With respect to the statutory limitations period, all circuit courts that
have considered whether the Suspension Clause invalidates § 2244(d)
on its face have affirmed the provision's constitutionality, usually be-
326 Procedural default is an equally important restriction but is not statutory; Although
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is argued in virtually every habeas case it is generally considered a
substantive limit on relief.
327 The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments usually appear in "as-applied"
challenges, not facial challenges.
328 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
329 See 1 FHCPP, supra note 20, § 7.2d & n.67 (collecting cases demonstrating the diffi-
culty of determining the scope of the writ); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspen-
sion Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 555, 555-62 (2002).
330 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94-95 (1807) ("[T]he power to award
the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written
law .... [without which vesting] the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its
suspension should be enacted.").
331 SeeJordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REv. 862, 864-65 (1994) (acknowledg-
ing that the Clause's phrasing "raises doubts about whether the Clause affords prisoners
even a qualified entitlement to habeas"); see also Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in
the Ratification Debates, 44 Buii. L. REv. 451, 451-52 (1996) (arguing that original intent
could be invoked in favor of four different interpretations of the Suspension Clause). But
see Steiker, supra, at 888-913 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
Suspension Clause in favor of state prisoners seeking a federal forum to redress violations
of federal law).
332 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001) ("'IThe substitution of a collateral
remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's deten-
tion' does not violate the Suspension Clause." (alteration in original) (quoting Swain v.
Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977))).
333 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
334 Id. at 663-65.
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cause offenders can seek habeas relief on the claim for a year, no mat-
ter how defective state postconviction process may have been.335 The
rule of thumb appears to be that, as long as a prisoner has some
means of raising a particular constitutional claim, a provision has not
unconstitutionally suspended the writ, at least on its face.
3 36
b. As-Applied Challenges
An as-applied challenge contends that a statutory provision is un-
constitutional under specific circumstances in which it applies. Of-
fenders with crime-innocence claims frequently argue that procedural
obstacles are unconstitutional as applied. The difficulty in mounting
as-applied challenges reflects the murky relationship between the
quasi-statutory habeas remedy and the constitutional violations that it
remediates: a federal remedy does not follow ipso facto from the exis-
tence of a constitutional violation. I remain skeptical as to the ulti-
mate viability of as-applied arguments that the Eighth Amendment,
Fourteenth Amendment, or Suspension Clause render procedural re-
strictions on the habeas writ unconstitutional. The Eighth Amend-
ment surely says something about the constitutionality of executing
such offenders making as-applied challenges, but its role in limiting
remedial restrictions is less clear.337 The remedial argument nonethe-
less has some appeal, no doubt because of the visceral discomfort
many express at the prospect of executing someone conclusively exon-
erated by DNA evidence. 338 Perhaps because the possibility of execut-
ing an ineligible offender does not necessarily provoke that same level
of discomfort, courts may be less likely to adopt a remedial interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment in that context.
For many of those same reasons, courts are also unlikely to sus-
tain substantive due process challenges to statutory procedural restric-
tions. Moreover, a Fourteenth Amendment "shocks the conscience"
test is always problematic for litigators, and the Roberts Court seems
especially unlikely to introduce such a test to control the constitu-
tional entitlement to a federal habeas forum. Herrera indicated that
the Court may be more solicitous of a procedural due process chal-
lenge, suggesting that a constitutional entitlement to habeas relief
335 See, e.g., Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2007); Wyzykowski v. Dep't
of Corrs., 226 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000); Lucidore v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 209
F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2000); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 977-78 (10th Cir. 1998).
336 Felker, 518 U.S. at 664-65; 1 FHCPP, supra note 20, § 7.2d.
337 Cf Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398-406 (1993) (concluding that the Eighth
Amendment does not clearly require habeas-relief issue to allow consideration of new
crime-innocence claims).
338 See David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER,




might arise upon a failure of state procedure. 339 That argument, how-
ever, also analytically conflates the question of whether a constitu-
tional violation exists with the question of whether the Constitution
requires that a federal habeas remedy exist to redress it. A court
would have to hold that a failure of state process would constitutionally
require a procedurally unobstructed federal habeas remedy-an argu-
ment more easily undertaken under the Suspension Clause.
The Suspension Clause is the only constitutional provision I dis-
cuss that expressly limits restrictions on the habeas remedy,340 and it
furnishes the Court with the greatest license to invalidate an other-
wise-legitimate procedural obstacle as applied to death-ineligibility
claims. The case law makes clear that the writ may be suspended indi-
rectly, such as when prisoners cannot obtain relief without overcom-
ing unreasonable procedural hurdles.3 41  Suspension Clause
jurisprudence is uniquely underdeveloped, and leaves the Court with
the sort of doctrinal flexibility that it would not have with the other
constitutional theories. It could, for example, determine that
§ 2244(b) or § 2244(d) is inadequate or ineffective for the purposes
of testing Atkins claims. 342 At least two sets of decisions indicate that
Suspension Clause theories could be viable in the ineligibility context:
(1) where § 2244(b) makes certain Ford competency claims impossible
to litigate 343 and (2) where § 2244(d) is applied to an offender who
can show crime innocence.
344
339 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407 n.6.
340 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509 n.329
(1987).
341 See, e.g.,Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969) (prison rules forbidding prison-
ers to seek assistance from other prisoners in writing habeas writs); Smith v. Bennett, 365
U.S. 708, 713 (1961) (financial hurdles for indigent offenders); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546,
548-49 (1941) (excessive prison preapproval conditions for federal habeas filing); see also
Davis v. Adult Parole Auth., 610 F.2d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that a "rule which
would permit a court to dismiss an action for habeas relief without any consideration of the
equities presented ... constitutes a prohibited suspension of the writ").
342 Professors Hertz and Liebman suggest that the writ may be suspended where com-
plicated federal claims become defective due to a failure of a prisoner to timely navigate
the state postconviction process without sufficient assistance from counsel. I FHCPP, supra
note 20, § 7.2d. That is precisely the scenario that many Atkins claimants encounter. See
supra Parts II.B.3 and III.A.2.
343 See In re Page, 179 F.3d 1024, 1026 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that § 2244(b) may be
unconstitutional in certain circumstances); cf Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628,
635 (9th Cir. 1997) (Nelson,J., specially concurring) (arguing that § 2244(b) is an uncon-
stitutional suspension of the writ as applied to Ford claims).
344 See Whitley v. Senkowski, 317 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding a case that
dismissed a habeas petition as time-barred although petitioner alleged crime innocence
and instructing the district court to determine whether petitioner made a credible showing
of actual innocence and whether such showing excepted him from being time-barred);
Wyzykowski v. Dep't of Corrs., 226 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2000); Molo v. Johnson,
207 F.3d 773, 775 (5th Cir. 2000); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (ac-
knowledging that a limitations period may render the habeas remedy inadequate as ap-
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c. Constitutional Avoidance
Based on the emerging pattern in Suspension Clause cases,
courts are unlikely to declare the successive petition or statute-of-limi-
tations bars unconstitutional as applied to ineligible offenders. 345 By
practicing a fairly aggressive form of constitutional avoidance, courts
do, however, appear quite willing to avoid state executions that violate
the Eighth Amendment. The license to conduct such interpretation
is actually well established, as the Supreme Court has historically ig-
nored restrictive statutory wording and has emphasized its common
law authority to shape the writ's function. 346 Despite the confusion
over precisely what the Suspension Clause actually means (and over
whether a decision to revoke the writ for state prisoners could even
constitute suspension),347 it may be a promising theory upon which to
premise avoidance because it is the Constitution's primary reference
to remedies. 348 Moreover, at least three members of the Court have
expressed their willingness to consider an avoidance interpretation
based on a more general constitutional prohibition on erroneously
executing offenders.
3 49
In what follows, I explore what this avoidance looks like under
the § 2244(b) bar on successive and abusive claims, as well as under
the § 2244(d) statute of limitations. The crime-innocence and
mental-competency decisions discussed in the previous subsection
provide a blueprint for how federal courts may standardize the treat-
ment of ineligibility claims. Because avoidance is already an estab-
lished feature of cases interpreting the habeas statute, federal courts
may avert the execution of ineligible offenders without wading for-
mally into modern Suspension Clause jurisprudence.
Successive and Abusive Petitions. Section 2244(b) (1) states that all
successive claims shall be dismissed, and § 2244(b) (2) provides for the
same treatment of abusive claims, except for previously unavailable
claims expressly made retroactive by the Supreme Court and claims
that, but for cause to have omitted them from the original petition,
would establish innocence of the underlying crime by clear and con-
plied to an actually innocent offender); Holloway v. Jones, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190
(E.D. Mich. 2001); Alexander v. Keane, 991 F. Supp. 329, 334-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
345 The Supreme Court, however, has recently suggested that AEDPA provisions might
be unconstitutional as applied to meritorious crime-innocence claims. See In re Davis, No.
08-1443, 2009 WL 2486475, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2009) (citing, with approval, Triestman v.
United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377-80 (2d Cir. 1997)).
346 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
347 See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
348 See supra note 340and accompanying text.
349 See In re Davis, 2009 WL 2486475, at *2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Moreover, available data suggests that Atkins has not opened any floodgates of frivo-
lous litigation. See Blume et al., supra note 153, at 628.
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vincing evidence. 350 On first blush, AEDPA therefore appears to have
eliminated relief for any successive claim and winnowed the abusive-
claim gateway down to a pure crime-innocence inquiry. In order to
avoid the Suspension Clause and procedural due process issues men-
tioned above, however, courts may nonetheless construe AEDPA to
allow merits consideration of ineligibility claims in successive
petitions.
The Supreme Court has a rich history of ignoring potentially re-
strictive wording when interpreting the habeas statute's limits on abu-
sive and successive claims. 351 When the Court decided Sanders v.
United States in 1963, it borrowed without explanation the "ends of
justice" exception for abusive claims by state prisoners, and it created
a presumption in favor of entertaining successive claims for federal
prisoners even though the statute appeared to support an opposing
inference.3 52 In 1966 Congress eliminated any statutory reference in
§ 2244(b) to "the ends of justice," but Kuhlmann v. Wilson continued
to apply that exception to successive claims.
353
Nor have federal courts been bashful about interpreting AEDPA's
more recent and facially severe limits in favor of petitioners.35 4 For
example, the Supreme Court has highlighted the absurdity of apply-
ing § 2244(b) to a Ford claim in a prior petition that was dismissed as
premature.3 55 Lower courts have followed suit by adopting a number
of nonliteral § 2244(b) avoidance interpretations, including holdings
that a subsequent petition is not "second or successive" (1) because it
does not attack the same judgment as a prior petition and (2) because
a prior petition was not denied on the merits.
35 6
Perhaps the most significant area where the Supreme Court has
abandoned a literalist interpretation of § 2244(b) is in its Ford compe-
tency cases. Ford claims present a unique problem because they are
usually not ripe for inclusion in an offender's initial habeas petition.
350 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2006).
351 See Steiker, supra note 25, at 342 ("Despite this statutory guidance, the Court's ap-
proach to 'successive' and 'abusive' petitions likewise has been fashioned without close
attention to statutory language.... [B]oth the Warren and the Rehnquist Courts designed
their own substantive standards governing such petitions wholly apart from statutory
language.").
352 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1963).
353 See 477 U.S. 436, 451-52 (1986).
354 See Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a literalist inter-
pretation of § 2244(b) and agreeing with other courts that the interpretation of the provi-
sion "involves the application of the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ principles" (citation
omitted)); Vancleave v. Norris, 150 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1998) (observing that the Su-
preme Court rejects a literalist interpretation of the term "second or successive").
355 Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998); see Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (affirming analysis in Martinez-Villareal).
356 See 2 FHCPP, supra note 20, § 28.3b(i) (different judgment) (collecting cases); id.
§ 28.3(ii) (no prior meitsjudgment) (collecting cases).
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Prior to AEDPA, no federal appellate court had barred a Ford claim on
the ground that it was abusive. 357 In both Panetti and Stewart v. Marti-
nez-Villareal,358 the Court confronted post-AEDPA Ford challenges that
were not decided in the offenders' first round of habeas litigation,
and in each instance the Court found a way to permit merits consider-
ation of the claim. 359 In both cases, the Court refused to apply
§ 2244(b) because, it reasoned, the provision simply codified com-
mon law doctrine. 360 In Panetti, the Court expressly eschewed a liter-
alist interpretation of § 2244(d) in favor of a functional competency
rule that avoided "troublesome results" and that did not "close [fed-
eral courts] to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review without any
clear indication that such was Congress' [s] intent."361
Death-ineligibility categories pose different successive petition
challenges depending on the type of claim involved. For newly de-
clared constitutional rules that the Supreme Court expressly makes
retroactive on collateral review (such as ineligibility holdings involving
mental retardation or juvenile status), the successive-petition provi-
sion poses less of a hurdle because § 2244(b) (2) (A) carves out an ex-
ception for those claims. 362 For ineligibility categories creating
challenges that remain premature at trial, federal courts may simply
apply Panetti's logic and hold that petitions containing such claims are
not "second or successive." If an ineligibility claim is presented in a
successive petition, but barred because it does not qualify under
§ 2244(b) (2) (A) or because the Panetti logic does not apply, courts
may nonetheless interpret the statute in a way that does not "close
[the courthouse] doors" to non-paradigm ineligibility categories that
Congress did not consider.3 6 3 I do not theorize every other conceiva-
ble statutory construction here, but the most obvious interpretive ma-
357 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 947 (2007) (quoting Barnard v. Collins, 13
F.3d 871, 878 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[O]ur research indicates no reported decision in which a
federal circuit court or the Supreme Court has denied relief of a petitioner's competency-
to-be-executed claim on grounds of abuse of the writ." (alteration in original)).
358 Panetti, 551 U.S. 930; Martinez-Villarea4 523 U.S. at 645-46.
359 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 943-47; Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 644.
360 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 943-44 (stating that the § 2244(b) is not "self-defining" but
rather "takes its full meaning from [the Court's pre-AEDPA] case law"); Martinez-Villarea4
523 U.S. at 645-46 (rejecting a literal reading of § 2244(b) to avoid "perverse" results).
361 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 946 (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 381 (2003)).
362 These claimants may still face considerable difficulty. For example, they must still
seek authorization from a circuit court under § 2244(b) (3) before filing their successive
petitions, and that authorization ruling is not reviewable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (3) (E)
(2006). Because there is no certiorari review of authorization determinations, ineligibility
claimants may be irreversibly but erroneously denied relief in that procedural posture. See,
e.g., In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (time-barring Atkins claimant on
authorization motion even though statute does not seem to permit consideration of affirm-
ative defense on such motion). Moreover, a court might deny relief on a meritorious claim
because that claim was not "previously unavailable" under § 2244(b) (2) (A).
363 See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 946.
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neuver would, pursuant to the Supreme Court's statement that the
AEDPA codifies existing abusive- and successive-writ jurisprudence, 3
64
imply to § 2244(b) the "ends of justice" exception that the Court has
always recognized.
365
Statute of Limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1) specifies the "trigger
dates" for the one-year limitations period on filing federal habeas peti-
tions. The limitations period runs from the latest of four events: (1)
the date a conviction becomes final on direct review; (2) the date on
which a state-created impediment to filing is eliminated; (3) the date
on which the Supreme Court recognized a retroactively applicable
constitutional right; or (4) the date on which a claim's factual predi-
cate could be discovered through due diligence. 366  Section
2244(d) (2) tolls the limitations period during state postconviction
proceedings. Whereas § 2244(b)'s successive petition limits have com-
mon law antecedents, the statute of limitations does not. Any avoid-
ance-based interpretation of § 2244(d) must therefore be predicated
on something other than the theory that AEDPA codified some ex-
isting doctrine. As I explain below, the Suspension Clause cases refer-
enced in Part III.C.2.a provide a framework for recognizing an
equitable-tolling exception to the statute of limitations.
3 67
For paradigm ineligibility claims (in which the petitioner argues
that no aggravating circumstances exist), the limitations period will
usually begin to run on the date that the conviction becomes final
under § 2244(d) (1) (A). For categories of ineligibility that the Su-
preme Court has recently recognized (such as mentally retarded and
juvenile offenders), the limitations period usually begins the day after
the case is decided under § 2244(d) (1) (C). For new substantive cate-
gories of ineligibility, the applicable limitations trigger will depend on
the attributes of the claim created. No matter which subsection of
§ 2244(d) applies, there is no statutory exception either for crime in-
nocence or for death ineligibility. Because Atkins has forced the issue,
the limitations question is only now percolating in the courts of ap-
peal. At least the Fifth Circuit appears poised to time-bar and allow
the execution of offenders it has legally determined to be mentally
retarded.3 66
364 See supra notes 351-56 and accompanying text.
365 See supra Part I.A.2.
366 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
367 An avoidance rationale might also support reading certain ineligibility claims to fall
under the § 2244(d) (1) (B) trigger for the removal of state-created filing obstacles or
under the § 2244(d) (1) (D) trigger for the discovery of a claim's factual predicate with due
diligence.
368 See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2007).
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Although the Supreme Court has never formally affirmed the
existence of equitable tolling under § 2244(d) ,369 every court of ap-
peals to consider the issue has recognized that events not specified in
the statute may equitably toll the statute of limitations37 0-usually
upon a showing of due diligence and extraordinary circumstances.
3 7 1
The circuits divide on the question of whether a showing of crime
innocence equitably tolls the statute of limitations,3 7 2 with several sug-
gesting that the rule applies in order to avert Suspension Clause
problems.37 3 Other courts have avoided Suspension Clause questions
by holding that an offender could not show actual innocence. 374 Jus-
tices Steven Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, and
David Souter have all indicated that they would consider a form of
equitable tolling to avoid unjust applications of the statute.3 75 An ad-
visory note to the 2004 Habeas Rule Amendments, without taking a
position, observes that equitable tolling is universally recognized.
3 76
In the death-ineligibility context, questions of equitable tolling
most frequently arise in connection with Atkins mental retardation
and Ford competency claims. Several circuits equitably toll the statute
of limitations once a prisoner shows that he is not competent to be
executed,-77 and others toll the statute only once the petitioner shows
a causal connection between his mental condition and his failure to
369 See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005).
370 See, e.g., Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2004); McClendon v.
Sherman, 329 F.3d 490, 492 (6th Cir. 2003); Helton v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 259 F.3d
1310, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000);
Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329-30 (4th Cir. 2000); Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d
13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000); Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir. 1999); Miller v. N.J.
State Dep't of Corrs., 145 F.3d 616, 617-18 (3d Cir. 1998); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976,
978 (10th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 810-12 (5th Cir. 1998); Calderon v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1997).
371 See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007).
372 Compare, e.g., Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Equitable
tolling would be appropriate, for example, when a prisoner is actually innocent." (citation
omitted)), with Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[Pletitioner's claims
of actual innocence .. .[do not] justify equitable tolling of the limitations period.").
373 See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2005) (collecting and citing
cases); sources cited supra note 344; cf Wyzykowski v. Dep't of Corrs., 226 F.3d 1213, 1218
(11th Cir. 2000) (stating that issue of actual innocence should be resolved before potential
conflict with the Suspension Clause is considered).
374 See, e.g., Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 174 (2d Cir. 2004) (declining to decide
whether actual innocence justified equitable tolling of limitations period on grounds that
offender did not make sufficient showing of innocence).
375 SeeDuncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183-84 (2001) (Stevens, J.,joined by Souter,J.
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 192-93 (Breyer, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J. dissenting)
376 See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 3 (2004 Amendment) of the Rules Gov-
erning Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
377 See, e.g., Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 163 F.3d 530, 541
(9th Cir. 1998) (holding that mental incompetence was an extraordinary circumstance
beyond prisoner's control that justified equitable tolling).
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file a timely petition.378 I can locate no federal appellate decision per-
mitting equitable tolling for an Atkins claim without the presence of
some other complicating factor or a showing that mental retardation
in some way frustrated the timeliness of federal filing. 379
The result of such confused treatment in the courts of appeals,
and of particularly harsh treatment in the Fifth Circuit (which in-
cludes the Texas capital docket), is that many offenders with legiti-
mate ineligibility challenges will not have the merits of their claims
entertained in federal court. Given the universal recognition of equi-
table tolling in the courts of appeal, as well as the procedural abyss of
state Atkins and Ford adjudication,380 future litigants may persuade
courts to apply equitable tolling to avoid Suspension Clause or other
constitutional issues-perhaps automatically upon a colorable show-
ing of ineligibility.
The most heavily litigated categories of non-paradigm ineligibility
will probably involve questions of diminished capacity, such as mental
retardation, incompetence, and, potentially, mental illness. State
postconviction litigation of these claims is highly problematic, 381 and
courts may be receptive to the theory that, where procedural obstacles
are too aggressively imposed on certain ineligibility categories, they
implicate the Suspension Clause.382 In Suspension Clause and equita-
ble tolling jurisprudence, courts have the two concepts they would
need to undertake constitutional avoidance: a constitutional provision
that undermines a literalist statutory interpretation, and a plausible
alternative construction. Several courts have been willing to equitably
toll the limitations period upon colorable showings of crime inno-
cence on that basis, 383 and there is actually a stronger argument for
the statutory cognizability of ineligibility claims. 38 4 There might be
still other avoidance arguments, including those involving
§ 2244(d) (1) (B) (changing the limitations trigger to the date state-
imposed obstacles are removed) and § 2244(d) (1) (D) (changing the
378 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005) (refusing to
apply equitable tolling absent showing of "causal connection between (petitioner's] al-
leged mental incapacity and [petitioner's] ability to file a timely petition"); Nara v. Frank,
264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that in order to justify equitable tolling, "mental
incompetence must somehow have affected the petitioner's ability to file a timely habeas
petition" (citation omitted)).
379 See, e.g., In re Lewis, 484 F.3d 793, 798 n.20 (5th Cir. 2007) ("We have previously
applied the limitations period to Atkins claims, including a claim in which the petitioner
had made a prima facie showing of mental retardation.").
380 See supra Part lII.A.
381 See supra Part III.A.2.
382 See supra notes 340-44 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 372-73.
384 See supra Part III.B. I do not mean to imply that statutory cognizability is the only,
or even the major, factor that goes into an equitable-tolling determination.
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limitations trigger to the date a claim's factual predicate is
discoverable).
The important point is that the statute of limitations, which lacks
a common law antecedent, is uniquely amenable to Suspension
Clause challenges because ineligibility turns on membership in a
death-exempt category, and because Suspension Clause challenges
may proceed on that level of categorical granularity. s8 5 Although I
doubt that courts would actually declare the limitations statute to be
an unconstitutional suspension of the writ, they should be willing to
invoke that doctrine to conduct constitutional avoidance-thereby re-
jecting the application of § 2244(d) to meritorious ineligibility claims.
CONCLUSION
I have tried to map the various common law, statutory, and con-
stitutional dimensions of the burgeoning death-ineligibility phenome-
non. Our existing habeas corpus regime is largely informed by
critiques of Warren-era litigation, which are not well suited to ineligi-
bility adjudication. Under the prevailing habeas model, offenders
with meritorious ineligibility claims may be executed because the peti-
tion containing their claim is procedurally defective. By invoking the
Suspension Clause, equitable principles, and the canon of constitu-
tional avoidance, federal courts may nonetheless be able to avert state
executions that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids.
385 See supra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
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